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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah
Code Annotated (1953).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(Including standards of review and supporting authority.)
The following are the issues that appear to be presented by Appellant's brief:
1. The trial court having denied both parties respective cross motions for
summary judgment and Brown's Motion 1o Strike Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen and having
required that the case proceed to trial, having heard the evidence and having made its
findings of fact and conclusions of law and having entered a final judgment thereon, does
the trial court's prior refusal to strike Jorgensen's affidavit and denial of summary
judgment in favor of Brown, against whom the final judgment was rendered, present an
appealable issue? The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable
order. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1997) and Jensen v.
Nielsen, 447 P.2d 906 (Utah 1968).1
2. Since Brown's appeal appears to challenge the findings of fact made by the
trial court but fails to marshall the supporting evidence, will the reviewing court review
the trial court's findings of fact? If an appellant fails to marshall the evidence and then
"ferret out a fatal flaw" therein sufficient to convince the appellate court that the findings
1

Only an appeal from the granting of a final summary judgment presents either the
question of whether the trial court erred in determining there was no genuine material
issue of fact for trial or the question of whether the trial court made an incorrect ruling of
law which the appellate court reviews under a standard of correctness, according no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Maoris & Associates v. Images &
Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1997).

are clearly erroneous, the appellate court assumes the record supports the trial court's
findings. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), Awinc Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d
1228 (Utah App. 2005) and West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah
App. 1991).
3. Should the trial court have modified the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
by ruling that Brown could acquire 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's unimproved rural property
by proving only that Brown personally believed Brown's property extended clear up the
hill in back of his property up to an old livestock fence above an irrigation ditch and that
Jorgensen/predecessors did not affirmatively protest whatever use Brown had been
making of the portion of Jorgensen's property lying below the old fence? The trial
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198
(Utah 1991).
4. After the trial and the court ruled title should be quieted in Jorgensen, should
the trial court have vacated its findings and ruling that Brown's evidence was insufficient
to establish the elements of boundary by acquiescence and have granted Brown a
prescriptive easement of some sort concerning Jorgensen's 6.94 acres, notwithstanding
no prescriptive easement theory had been recognized or tried by express or implied
consent of the parties? The trial court's application of Rule 15(b) and determination of
whether an issue was tried by express or applied consent are legal questions reviewed for
correctness. Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998) and Fibro Trust, Inc. v.
Brahman Financial Inc., 91A P.2d 288 (Utah 1999).

5. Jorgensen having filed no post trial memorandum of costs, does the statement
in the judgment that "Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court as
may hereafter be established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements filed pursuant
to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" present an appealable issue for Brown?
There is no appellate court jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order not
constituting a final judgment. R.H.D. v. S.F., 969 P.2d 947 (Utah App. 1998).
6. Brown not having complained to the trial court concerning the (harmless)
statement in the judgment quieting title to Jorgensen's property in Jorgensen free and
clear of all claims of Brown "and of all claims of all other persons who may claim by,
through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or either of them," is any
issue pertaining thereto presented for appeal? To preserve an issue for review on appeal,
the issue must have been presented to the trial court. Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073
(Utah App. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellants Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown, "Brown", and
Defendant/Appellee Lee Jorgensen, "Jorgensen", own adjoining parcels of rural property
in Summit County, Utah. Brown owns approximately 17 acres. Jorgensen owns
approximately 195 acres, mostly up the mountain from the Brown parcel, which
Jorgensen and an associate purchased for investment in 1979.
Brown made claim to 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property lying below part of an
old hillside fence which ran north out of a canyon, a northwest fork of which then ran

northwesterly above Brown's property about 1900 feet along a hillside through sagebrush
above an irrigation ditch on Jorgensen's property, asserting entitlement on the basis of the
judicial doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
Brown's trial evidence was essentially that Brown believed Brown owned all
property lying downhill from the old hillside fence and had used that property for grazing
and other use without objection from Jorgensen/predecessors for many years. Brown had
a survey made of Brown's property in 1971 when Brown took title which showed all
Brown owned was about 17 acres but Brown testified he did not understand it showed his
property line was not the old fence line and testified that the old fence was erected by his
father in the 1940s and that he believed it was erected on Brown's property line.
Jorgensen's trial evidence essentially consisted of the recorded chain of title and
surveys which showed there were no gaps or overlaps in the parties respective adjoining
property legal descriptions; that in 1978 Jorgensen had been shown where the actual then
staked property line existed below the irrigation ditch before he purchased the property;
that Jorgensen had entered his property several times along an old road along the
irrigation ditch assuming both were on his property and without which access to his
(mountain) property he would not have purchased the property; that Jorgensen never had
understood or believed the old fence was a boundary line and regarded the old leaning
hillside fence posts as meaningless.
No evidence was presented as to how Tracy Land & Livestock Company, a
Corporation (R. 170), Jorgensen's principal predecessor in interest, considered the fence
or whether Tracy even knew of its existence.

The trial court determined that Brown's evidence did not show both owners had
acquiesced in the fence as a boundary line and entered judgment quieting title in favor of
Jorgensen.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Brown's complaint, seeking 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property under the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence, was filed May 30, 2001 (R. 1-5).
On June 19, 2001, Jorgensen filed an Answer and Counterclaim seeking to quiet
Jorgensen's title to the 6.94 acre parcel and a judgment requiring Brown to remove the
new 1994-1995 hillside fence Brown had erected on the old fence line and a wood fence
Brown had constructed on a portion of the 6.94 acres along the county highway which
obstructed entry to the road paralleling the irrigation ditch which provided access on and
into Jorgensen's property. (R. 7-14)
On December 21, 2001, Brown filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 59-60).
On January 22, 2002, Jorgensen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 111-112).
On February 20, 2002, Brown filed a Motion to Strike an Affidavit of Lee
Jorgensen (R. 113-120) which Jorgensen had filed in support of Jorgensen's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.
235-236).

By Ruling and Order filed April 6, 2002 the trial court (Judge Robert K. Hilder)
denied Brown's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen and denied both motions
for summary judgment. (R. 281-283)

2

Judge Hilder's April 6, 2002 Ruling and Order granted partial summary judgment,
stating "plaintiff satisfies element (iii) and (iv) of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, as follows: If the fact finder determines that elements (I) and (ii), are met,
plaintiffs will not be required to prove the remaining elements at trial." (R. 281-283). On
May 7, 2002, Jorgensen filed a Motion for Clarification of Ruling (the April 6, 2002
Ruling and Order) and Determination of Scope of Relevant Evidence (R. 285-266). By
minute entry dated June 20, 2002, Judge Hilder ruled that the evidentiary issues raised
were more properly the subject of motions in limine or issues best raised at trial and that
under the court's April 6, 2002 ruling and order, the fact finder would not have to find
that Jorgensen failed to raise any objection but such issue would "not even be reached
unless the fact finder is persuaded that there was something to object to; for example, a
visible and continuously existing line, and that the line, if it existed, was acquiesced in as
the boundary" (R. 311-312). On May 28, 2003, Jorgensen filed a Motion in Limine and
for Determination of Legal Relevance of Deeds and Maps/Other Evidence of Deed Lines
and for Other Relief. (R. 333-335). By Ruling and Order filed September 22, 2003 (R.
424-431) the trial court (Judge Bruce C. Lubeck) ruled: 1) Inasmuch as both parties
concede the record title reflects Jorgensen is the owner of the disputed property, Brown
had the burden of proof as the party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 2) The burden
of proof was a preponderance of the evidence and not a burden to prove boundary by
acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. 3) There was insufficient basis for the
court to disallow Brown's testimony about what he assumed his (deceased) father
believed about the fence which was erected in the 1940s hence the court would consider
objections to specific statements during Brown's trial testimony. 4) Notwithstanding,
Jorgensen's record legal title to the property, since Judge Hilder had previously decided
as a matter of law that the boundary was established for a long period of time and
established by adjoining land owners with the only remaining issues for trial being
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or boundaries and mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, Brown's evidence in support of the latter two
prongs of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence would be decided at trial. 5) Brown's
boundary by acquiescence claim was not barred by Section 25-5-1 of Utah's statute of
frauds because the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence supercedes the statute of frauds,
notwithstanding decisional case law has not specifically addressed the impact of the
statute of frauds on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 6) The Section 78-12-7
U.C.A. presumption that Jorgensen possessed his property and that any use thereof by
Brown was under and in subordination to Jorgensen's legal title is solely applicable to
adverse possession claims and not to a boundary by acquiescence case.

Following the trial court's disposition of subsequent motions (see footnote 2) the
case was tried before Judge Bruce C. Lubeck.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
Following a bench trial on March 31 and April 1, 2004, Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
made and entered a very detailed Memorandum Decision discussing the law and
containing twelve separately numbered findings of fact and eight separately numbered
conclusions of law. (R. 481-491, Addendum II hereto) The court found that
Brown/predecessors had been using Jorge risen's property below the old fence for
approximately fifty-three years since Brown's father erected the fence and that the basic
issue for the court was whether the use made of Jorgensen's property by
Brown/predecessors amounted to acquiring the property under the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence.
The court ruled that to show mutual acquiescence, Brown had the burden of
proving that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line as a demarcation
between the properties; that both parties had knowledge of the existence of a line as a
boundary line and must have recognized and treated an observable line, such as a fence,
as the boundary dividing properties, and ruled that mere conversation between the parties
evidencing an ongoing dispute or an unwillingness of one to accept the line refutes the
allegation of mutual acquiescence; that occupation of land up to a fence is not sufficient
if the owner does not acquiesce in the fence as a boundary and that evidence of
knowledge of recorded deeds and instruments were not relevant in a boundary by
acquiescence case.

The court made detailed extensive findings of fact (R. 484-487). For clarity,
Jorgensen here separates these into separate sentences as follows:
Brown had repaired and replaced some of the fence as recently as the mid-1990s.
I 'he fence was observable since construction. tl lougl 1 at v arioi is poii its it i i lay ha\ e been
leaning down or covered by sagebrush. When Brown took title to some of what had been
the Brown family property in 1971, Brown had built a house on the 17 acres then deeded
to Brown. The fence was always considered by Brown to be tl le boundary line Browi I,
before building his house, commissioned a survey by Bush & Gudgell which showed that
Brown's property line was not the fence. Brown was legally aware of the metes and
bounds survey but did not understand it showed a property line different from the fence
line. Brown's subjective intent and belief was that the fence erected by his father in the
1940s was Brown's property line. Jorgensen's property is largely barren, hilly and
mostly sagebrush. Brown and his family had used the property below the fence to graze
cattle and sheep 1 1 lere was ai i ii rigation ditch which Bi own had i i laintained and
improved below on the downhill side of the fence. Brown caused some of the ditch to be
covered and installed culverts. Below the ditch there was a drop-off towards Brown's
property. Neither Jorgensen nor his predecessors 1 lad attempted to i ise or occup •} tl l e
property below the fence line which ran approximately 1900 feet above Brown's
property. If the property below the fence was considered as belonging to Brown, such
would add 6.94 acres to Plaintiffs 17 acre parcel. The irrigation ditch within the 6.94
acres originated at the (Weber) river and flowed northward downhill, towards and under
the county road. In July 1999 Jorgensen had written a note to Brown telling Brown that

Brown had built a fence on Jorgensen's property and that it should be removed.
Jorgensen had commissioned a survey shortly after that contact which was consistent
with Brown's 1971 metes and bounds survey. Brown was originally told in 1994 that the
true property line probably ran through his home but that was an error and the true line
was west of the home erected by Brown. Brown refused to remove the fence, filing an
action to quiet title, asserting the land was owned by Brown under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.
Jorgensen purchased his 195 acres in 1971 as an investment, having inspected the
property, observing fence posts visible at that time. Jorgensen was not aware by survey
of his exact and true boundary line but he assumed the line was below the fence and
irrigation ditch and utilized what he believed was a road on his property below the
irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to the properly. Such was not a
road but was rather used to work along the irrigation ditch. A fence erected by Brown
ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet from the road. Jorgensen's predecessors
ran livestock. There was no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its existence
and no evidence had been adduced that Tracy used or occupied the land on the downhill
side of the fence. Jorgensen took surveyors and potential buyers along the ditch but such
was not occupation of the land below the fence. Jorgensen, in anticipation of possible
buyers, commissioned a survey in 1994, which showed the true line was not the fence
line and Jorgensen always believed the true line was not the fence, which Jorgensen
claimed he did not see except for a few old leaning cedar posts and testified the boundary
line was downhill by the ditch where it was marked with a flag when Jorgensen first

inspected the property. The survey Jorgensen commission showed Jorgensen was correct
about the true boundary line and that it was not the fence line.
The surveys were consistent with all the recorded instruments, which showed the
true boundaries as depicted on Mxlubil 10 Jorgensen\s 1{){)4 survey was done by one
France who, along with a real estate broker, talked with Brown about the results. Brown
erected a wood rail fence along the highway to replace a wire fence and ran it across
approximately 167 feet of Jorgensen's proper t) to tl le dispi ited fence in the late 1990s
Vehicles could access the area by use of the road along the ditch before Brown's wooden
rail fence was installed. Each party operated in good faith.
The parties were constructively charged with knowledge of the true boundary line,
concerning which there was no legal uncertainty, rhere was "practical" uncertainty on
the part of Brown. Jorgensen had done nothing by word or deed to object to a visible
fence. The issue became whether Jorgensen's inaction as to the fence, which was erected
for a purpose not show n lb) 1:1 le e \ 'idence bi it b) inference was erected not to establish a
boundary line but for some other purpose, amounted to mutual acquiescence in that fence
as a boundary. (R. 484-487)
1 1 le coi li 1: i i mde detailed coi lclusioi is < :)f law (R 48 7 491), conch iding essentially
as follows:
1. Brown had constructive knowledge of the true property line since Brown
commissioned a survey in 197

.; deeds and documents showed the true boundary

line as well and that it was not the fence line constrt icted by Bi c »wn's father.

2. Jorgensen was the record title of the disputed land having had constructive
knowledge of the true property line since at least 1994 when he commissioned a survey
and having constructive knowledge since 1979 when he obtained a deed with a property
description.
3. Brown operated under the presumption the fence constructed in the 1940s by
his father was the property line.
4. The fence had been open and notorious and visible since the 1940s, on
occasion being in disrepair, but had been an observable fence since then.
5. Brown used and occupied the land as if it were his and was open and notorious
about his use and the fence served as an observable boundary for a long period of time
between two adjoining land owners.
6. The topography and terrain made the fence placement a practical place to erect
a fence as it would keep cattle and sheep off the lower irrigation ditch in the drop off and
off what was in the 1940s pasture land until the home was built in 1971.
7. Given the slope, the irrigation ditch and the terrain, the court inferred and
concluded that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock and to keep grazing
livestock of the predecessor owner of the Brown property and was not intended as a
boundary line demarcating the property.
8. There had been occupation of the land by Brown up to the fence. There had
been no occupation by Jorgensen/predecessors below the fence, only to the fence.
9. There was no mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary.
10. The area is rural.

11. Jorgensen visited only on occasion as he purchased his 195 acres for
investment and had possible plans to subdivide the area.
12. Jorgensen di :11 lot 1 <
. ik .e a.ii> actioi I to oi ist Bi < : w i i, and remained silent relating
to Brown until 1999.

13. Jorgensen's commission of a survey in 1994 indicated a lack of acquiescence
since tl le hiring of a survey conveys :ie opposite ofacquiescen.ee and if Jorgensen... had
acquiesced in the notion the fence was the boundary he would not have commissioned a
survey hence, that act, though not conveyed directly to the Plaintiff, showed lack of
acquiescence, and unwillingness to accept the fence as the property line.
1 '• The fact of obtainii lg a si irve> was conveyed to Biw v n.. throi igh Wallace
France. But it need not have been conveyed to Brown to evidence Jorgensen's lack of
acquiescence or unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line.
15. Brown had to pi en • *1. t 11 iti lal acqi iiescence in tl: i..e fence as a boi indary by a
preponderance of the evidence.

16. The court disagreed with Brown's argument that unless Jorgensen proved lack
of acquiescence, there was acquiescence.
17. Any action showing an unwillingness to acknowledge the fence as a boundary
was sufficient to defeat application of the doctrine since Brown had to prove
acquiescence on the part of both parties, which "recognized and acknowledged" a visible
line as a boundary line.

18. There is no good reason to determine that lack of acquiescence is only
effective if conveyed to the opposing land owner since the doctrine requires that there be
an actual acknowledgement and that both parties treat the fence as a common boundary.
19. Telling others the fence is not the boundary or hiring a surveyor seemed to the
court to defeat the idea of an acknowledgement in a boundary line.
20. Brown was aware in 1994 there was a dispute when France talked to him
about the property line being other than at the fence line.
21. The seeming inaction of Jorgensen was not shown as approval of the fence as
a boundary line.
22. Brown's argument sought, in effect, to reduce the elements of boundary by
acquiescence from four to three, to simple occupation of land up to a visible fence or
boundary without more.
23. Occupation of land up to a fence or boundary without more is not
acquiescence, the court rejecting Brown's argument.
24. Brown had to show that Tracy recognized and acknowledged the visible line
and while there may be an inference Tracy, running livestock, saw the fence, that was
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let alone acknowledged it
as a boundary line.
25. The four elements of the doctrine do not overlap.
26. Failure to occupy by Tracy coupled with occupation by Brown did not
amount to acknowledgement of the fence as a boundary.

27.

The elements o f boundary by acquiescence had not been proved by Brown

though there had been occupation by Brown up to a visible mark over a long period of
time over twenty years and the parties were adjoining land owners.
28.
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acquiescence by both parties in the fence as the boundary line.

29. While Jorgensen did not oust Brown, Jorgensen did not agree the fence was
the boi indary.
30.

Given the court's conclusion about the action o f Jorgensen in 1994 amounting

to a dispute because o f a failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there had not even
been an undisputed period of twenty years since Jorgensen took ownership.
31. Recent court decisions were confusing bi it mean that knowledge of the act ual
true boundary is not relevant.
32. Although there never was legal uncertainty at to the true boundary line, there
was actual i incei tail it) " bi it tl lat does i lot allc vv the docti Iiie of boi mdai j by acquiescence
to grant an interest in property.
33.

The appearance of the area, the terrain, the nature of the land and its use by

the parties did not allow a residei it t :> obtaii i lai id b) r i i lei ely coi isti ucting a fence and then
merely because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence removed, claim
title to the area up to the fence.
34.

Brown did not intend to appropriate the land nor was there evidence the fence

was erected for an improper pi u pose bi it the clear inference was tl lat tl ic fence was
erected to contain livestock and protect a ditch and not to establish a boundary line.

35. Brown's predecessors' record deeds all showed the actual boundary lines of
the properties.
36. Brown did not show that Jorgensen or his predecessors mutually acquiesced
for twenty years in the fence as a property line.
37. The statute of frauds did not apply.
38. Jorgensen was entitled to have his title quieted per the recorded instruments.
(R. 481-492)
Brown filed objections to Jorgensen's proposed order quieting title to the 6.94
acres in Jorgensen, requesting a formal set of findings and conclusions be prepared
separate from the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the court's
memorandum decision, objecting to the proposed order incorporating the metes and
bounds description of the 6.94 acres claimed by Brown because the court's findings did
not reference that description, objecting to language in the proposed order concerning
removal offences because the court's memorandum decision did not so state and
objecting to language in the order awarding costs upon the filing of a cost memorandum.
(R. 493-500, Addendum III hereto)
Following the filing of Jorgensen's memorandum responding to Brown's
objections to the proposed order (R. 501-504) the court scheduled oral argument on
Brown's objections to take place July 12, 2004. (R. 505-507)
On June 15, 2004, Brown filed a Post Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to
Conform to the Evidence; Motion to Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter
or Amend the Court's Memorandum Decision and Request for Hearing (R. 535-537) by

which Brown requested the comt to allow Plaintiff to amend Plaintiffs pleading "to
conform to the evidence tried by consent on issues of prescriptive easement" arguing that
the court should amend its findings and memorandum decision and determine Brown's
use of Jorgenseii s pi o p a l " li.i I 'riprncti into a p i v s r n p h \ c r a s n n n i f ' (Brown's
Memorandum o f Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff s Post Trial Motion to
Amend Pleadings, Findings and Memorandum Decision, R. 526-534.)
- - lorgensen filed a memorandum in opposition to Brown's motion,
(R. 538-548), and Brown filed a response to Jorgensen's opposition memorandum (R.
549-558). After the July 12, 2004 oral argument (R. 559) on Brown's objection to
Jorgensen's proposed order and on Brown's motion to amend Brown's pleadings and to
alter or amend the court's n lei iioi andum decision, oi i Ji il) • 15, 2:004, the coiii I: made a
Ruling and Order (R. 565-568, Addendum IV hereto) directing Jorgensen to prepare a
slightly modified judgment, including the property description as set forth in Jorgensen's
proposed order, as the com t foi md that description was an acci n ate description of the
property, and ordering Brown to remove the fence along the roadway and improvements
to the hillside fence which had been installed by Brown.
I hit Kulnip, .iiitl < hilei denied Brown's motion to amend Brown's pleadings and
to amend the court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision because the court's decision
was made entirely on Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim and Jorgensen's quiet
title counterclaim The court specifically found:
1. ' I he court's decision was NO I based oi i tl ie dc eti it le • :)f prescriptive easement.

2. The court did not view the trial as one where the parties agreed explicitly or
implicitly to try any prescriptive easement or any other cause of action other than
Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim.
3. The phrase "prescriptive easement" was not uttered during the trial and was
certainly not briefed nor argued.
4. The court did not make its decision based on that doctrine.
5. Whether the evidence supported or did not support such a claim was not the
issue.
6. Had Jorgensen been given a chance to address and challenge that theory, the
court had no idea what the facts would have shown and what legal conclusions might
have been drawn.
7. While there was testimony on use by Brown, Jorgensen did not focus on that
because the focus was on who had title to the land.
8. Jorgensen had the right to know what claims he was defending against and he
was defending against a claim of Brown that Brown had title to the property under the
property law doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
9. The court did not understand and Jorgensen did not understand that the
evidence was aimed at establishing an easement of any kind in favor of Brown.
10. The evidence having been presented by Brown and by Jorgensen to convince
the court that either Brown or Jorgensen had title to the disputed land, which the court
decided, the court did not attempt to nor did it decide anything else.

11. Brown might have originally alleged alternative theories of title or easement
or Brown could have amended pleadings long ago, having filed the case in May 2001 and
that the matter could have been tried on alternative theories.
Iz. ii so, Jorgensen "^"iM h?{ e facet) and challenged <vi<'h (»i either iheory.
13. Jorgensen did not defend against a claim of easement usage by Brown.
1

4 The court did not decide such.

15. Jorgensei i did not i i 101 n it a defense to tl ic: i lse and coi ltinuoi is aspects of
prescriptive easement law because Jorgensen did not know Brown was claiming that.
16. Whether there were defenses to such facts as Brown could present is
unknown.
17. The court could not decide if Brown had a viable case for a prescriptive
easement based on the facts the parties presented.
It would be fundamentally unfair to allow Brown to seek recovery of a
different sort < -

different cai lse of actioi I seeking certain pern: lissive use rathei thai i

title, what was asked for in Brown's pleading (R. 565-567, Addendum IV hereto).
On August 2, 2004, judgment was entitled quieting title to Jorgensen's property in
Jorgensen ai id dii ecting remo\ al of tl ic Bi o v(« i I fei ice/fence improvements whir

ii >wn

had placed thereon in 1995. (R. 569-573, Addendum V hereto). The judgment quieted
title in Jorgensen free and clear of all boundary by acquiescence/other claims of Thomas
E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all other persons who may claim
by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, I":t ; n u 1 M ; u ilyi l R Bi < m n. or either < )f tl lei n The
judgment directed Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. to forthwith remove the wood fence

erected by him along Brown's Canyon Road in a portion of the Jorgensen property and to
remove the hillside wire fence improvements installed by Brown. The judgment stated
Jorgensen "should be and is hereby awarded his costs of court incurred herein as may
hereafter be established by memorandum of costs and disbursements filed pursuant to
Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 569-573, Addendum V hereto)
Brown filed Brown's Notice of Appeal on August 25, 2004. (R. 574)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Jorgensen filed an Affidavit of Facts in Support of Jorgensen's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.
113-120)
2. Brown filed a Motion to Strike the Jorgensen Affidavit. (R. 235-236)
3. By Ruling and Order filed April 6, 2002 (R. 281-284), Judge Hilder denied
Brown's motion to strike the affidavit of Lee Jorgensen for the reasons stated in the
memorandum Jorgensen filed in opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. 266-272; 281) and denied both parties respective motions for summary judgment,
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Jorgensen's Memorandum in Opposition to Brown's Motion to Strike (R. 266-272)
pointed out:
1. Brown had not specifically identified what statements of fact in Jorgensen's
Affidavit Brown felt objectionable.
2. The Jorgensen Affidavit specifically stated Jorgensen had personal knowledge of
the matters set forth in the Affidavit.
3. The Affidavit affirmed what Brown had alleged as to Jorgensen holding title to the
6.94 acres sought by Brown.
4. Jorgensen's personal belief and state of mind as to the location of his property line
was obviously relevant and neither a "conclusion" nor a "supposition or
speculation" as apparently contended by Brown.
Jorgensen's Affidavit set forth:

a. The facts observed by Jorgensen and his personal understanding based thereon
as to the location of Jorgensen's northeasterly property line below the old fence,
irrigation ditch and "Ditch Road".
b. Jorgensen's 1978 observations of survey stakes along what became his
northeastern property line below the irrigation ditch and set forth information
given to Jorgensen at that time as to the property line being marked by stakesdownhill from the Ditch Road which provided the only viable access to the
property and was a significant reason why he purchased it.
c. Fence remnants were on the property when Jorgensen acquired it, which did not
show evidence of maintenance for many decades.
d. Information Jorgensen received from the agent of a realty company was that the
old fence remnants were within the property- information coinciding with
survey stakes and the legal description.
e. Jorgensen had visited the property a few times from 1978 to 1994 and in the
course of those visits had not observed livestock northeast (downhill) from the
old fence remnants.
f. Jorgensen had not run livestock on his property but had given others permission
to do so.
g. Jorgensen's understanding was that the fence remnants were meaningless.
h. In 1994, conversations with Brown had taken place (between Brown and others)
concerning possible sale/development of the Jorgensen property and Jorgensen
had personally observed that Brown thereafter rebuilt the old fence,
i. In 1999, Jorgensen visited the property again and observed a wooden fence
constructed by Brown obstructing the entrance to the Ditch Road and a new wire
fence where the old fence had been,
j . Jorgensen directed a handwritten letter to Brown dated July 30, 1999 which
Brown had made Exhibit "F" to Brown's December 20, 2001 memorandum, (R.
107) asking Brown to remove the fence,
k. Brown refused to remove the fence.
1. Jorgensen observed what appeared to have been efforts by Brown to obstruct the
old ditch road and described where the fence had been reconstructed in relation
to photographs taken by Jorgensen and photographs taken by Brown,
m. Jorgensen and Brown had a discussion thereafter in which Jorgensen did not
agree the old fence remnants were intended to be or should be regarded as
establishing the property line,
n. Jorgensen had never been uncertain about the location of his property line,
o. Jorgensen's opinion was that the old fence was to provide livestock control- an
opinion consistent with the use of net wire and barb wire in the old fence,
p. The recent increase in the property value of the 6.94 acres and the need for
access to the rest of Jorgensen's steep property provided by the Ditch Road
running through the 6.94 acres.

ruling that Brown had satisfied elements (iii) and (iv) of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, leaving elements (i) and (ii) for the fact finder at trial
4. The Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen (R. 113-120) was not made an exhibit at trial.
(See Exhibit list R. 479-480) nor was it referred to in the course of Jorgensen's
examination/cross-examination during which he testified essentially as set forth in his
Affidavit. (Tr. 14-37; 170-208; 296-297)
5. The statement of facts in Brown's brief consist of twenty-eight numbered
paragraphs. These refer to Brown's title to Brown's property, Jorgensen's title to
Jorgensen's property; the old fence, with some of Brown's interspersed conclusions;
Brown's claimed use of Jorgensen's property; Brown's 1971 survey of Brown's property;
some of the 1994 activity concerning Jorgensen possibly subdividing/selling part of this
property, including Wallace France showing Brown a 1994 Jorgensen property
subdivision lot diagram, (R. 209 is a copy) (Tr. 102-103; 257-259); Jorgensen's July
1999 letter to Brown asking Brown to remove the fence; a subsequent 1999 survey made
by Brown and Brown's filing action to quiet title to Jorgensen's 6.94 acres under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (Brown's Brief, pages 9-14).
6. Neither Brown's statement of facts nor Brown's argument (Brown's brief,
pages 16-47) attempts to marshal the evidence in support of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the trial court in its April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision (R.
481-492) finding the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock and keep cattle and
q. Jorgensen had paid all property taxes assessed against the property since he
acquired it. (R. 266-272)

sheep off the irrigation ditch and that Jorgensen/predecessor had not acknowledged the
old fence as a property line.
7. The trial court's finding that the old fence was erected for livestock control
rather than to establish a property line was fully supported, indeed compelled, by the
evidence including the following:
a. The historical and current record deed title evidence. Brown's chain of title
(Exhibit 5), Jorgensen's chain of title (Exhibit 18) and all the surveys, including the
survey Brown had made in 1971 (Exhibit 6) and 2000 (Exhibit 8) show the common
boundary line far down the hill from the old fence, and that the eastern part of the old
fence as it comes from the northwest jogs in a more southeasterly direction 58.36 feet
where it meets another fence. That fence runs south far into the canyon up into
Jorgensen's property and also runs north from that point of intersection about 112 feet
towards Brown's property to a gate, then jogs northeasterly across Jorgensen's property
into and across a corner of Brown's property "cutting off the southeast corner of
Brown's property by about 200 feet offence before the fence enters Marchant's property.
(See Jorgensen's January 22, 2002 Memorandum, R. 134 and R. 153 (plat map); R. 215
(portion of survey showing property lines/fence lines in that area.) (Brown apparently
never conceded the corner of Brown's property southeast of that 200 feet or so part of the
fence to adjoining land owner Marchant.4)

Jorgensen's memorandum filed January 22, 2002 (R. 121-150) analyzes the parcel
descriptions used in deeds of record, none of which refer to any fences, in the context of
their dates, the county plat map and surveys showing the fence and the party's respective
adjoining parcels (R. 153). In the canyon, the fence line jogs southerly into the canyon

b. The evidence concerning the location of the old fence along a relatively steep
hillside above an irrigation ditch and ditch road (Exhibit 3, contour map, and 4,
photographs; R. 127, 154, 156-169).
c. The (volunteered) testimony of Lloyd Marchant as to bringing "cattle down
and along that fence into our property" (Marchant property lying south and east of
Brown's property and east of Jorgensen's property). (Tr. 39)
d. The fact the old fence was a cedar post net wire and barb wire fence. (Tr. 273,
276; R. 163-166)
e. The fence was allowed to fall into substantial disrepair. Brown's "to whom it
may concern" letter dated March 20, 2001 stated the fence
"was overrun with sagebrush and in great disrepair. In the summer of 1995 I
rebuilt the north portions of the fence along the old fence line using steel posts and
new wire.. .portions of rotted- off cedar posts are still visible along portions of the
fence line...." (Exhibit 15 and R. 155).
Brown's letter shows the fences original use for livestock control had become
unnecessary in later years (even as to containing any livestock Brown testified he ran
below the fence) as land usage changed. Brown's substantial fence repair undertaking
took place after Brown visited with Wally France and Craig McPhee and others in 1994
and learned of Jorgensen's possible plans to subdivide part of his property (R. 490; Tr.
16-17; 20-28; 34-37).

and a branch of the fence runs northerly in that canyon area, thence northeasterly. The
jogging intersecting fences and gates in that area could only have functioned for livestock
control/access and make no sense whatsoever in terms of the parties respective straight
section line/quarter section line deed descriptions in that area. (R. 153; R. 128-133 and
exhibits thereto: R. 170, 172, 174, 176, 101, 180, 184, 186, and 215)

8. Brown submitted no evidence concerning how Tracy Land & Livestock
Company, a Corporation, or T. Tracy Wright regarded the old fence. Tracy, Jorgensen's
principal predecessor owner, per recorded deeds, owned what later became Jorgensen5s
property between June 16, 1947 and April 3, 1978. (R. 170, Tracy 1947 deed; R. 174 and
R. 176 deeds, copies of which are included in Exhibit 18). The court was unwilling to
infer that Tracy had acquiesced for at least twenty years in the old fence as Tracy's
property line without evidence of how Tracy actually regarded the old fence. (R. 490)
9. The trial court's finding that there had not been a period of twenty years since
Jorgensen's ownership during which there was no dispute as to the effect of the old fence
was fully supported by Jorgensen's evidence that he saw stakes on the actual property
line downhill from the fence and irrigation ditch when he visited the property in 1978
before buying it in 1979; he entered what he assumed was his property along the Ditch
Road below the old fence several times; he assumed the old "skiwampus" fence posts
were meaningless and commenced action in 1994 to possibly subdivide some of his
property, including the part below the old fence, which action was communicated to
Brown in 1994 by means of conversations between Brown, Wally France, Craig McPhee
and others, 1994 being the first time Jorgensen even learned there might be a problem
with Brown about the boundary line. (R. 490; Tr. 16-17; 20-28; 34-37; 170-185)
10. The trial court's finding Jorgensen had not acquiesced in the old fence as his
boundary line was compelled not only by the above referenced evidence but also by
Jorgensen's getting a survey in 1994 and another in 2000 and Jorgensen writing a letter to

Brown in July 1999 asking Brown to remove the fence. (Tr. 34-35; 189-90; Exhibits 8
and 13)
11. The trial court's April 7, 2004 Post Trial Memorandum Decision and July 15,
2004 Ruling and Order denying Brown's post trial motion to amend Brown's pleading,
amend the court's findings, vacate the court's memorandum decision and grant Brown a
prescriptive easement, make it very clear the case was tried and decided solely and only
on Brown's boundary by acquiescence theory, not on any prescriptive easement theory.
(R. 481-492 and R. 565-567) Brown's brief does not attempt to show otherwise.
12. Jorgensen filed no memorandum of costs and disbursements following entry
of the court's August 2, 2004 judgment quieting title to Jorgensen's property in
Jorgensen.
13. Brown did not make any trial court objection to the inclusion in the judgment
of language quieting title in Jorgensen against any persons who may claim under Brown.
(R. 493-500, Brown's objection to proposed order; R. 518-519; R. 535-537 and R. 526533, Brown's post trial motion and memorandum)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The trial court's ruling denying Brown's Motion to Strike Jorgensen's
Affidavit, which was not even mentioned at trial, was not a final appealable order nor
was the trial court's ruling denying Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. Browns having failed to marshall the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings of fact and having failed to show any clear error therein, this court assumes the
record supports the findings.

3. The trial court's post trial Memorandum Decision itself abundantly sets forth
the evidence presented by each party, largely undisputed, upon which the trial court made
its very detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and its decision.
4. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence does not permit an adjoining
landowner to acquire neighboring land by merely using/occupying it for over twenty
years such as for livestock grazing up to a fence without ouster/objection from the
property owner.
5. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence requires satisfactory proof that both
landowners actually intended a visible line such as the fence to be their property line and
such an intent cannot be inferred against the record title holder from the title holder's lack
of objection to the adjoining owner's use.
6. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence contravenes both statute of fraud
Section 25-5-1, U.C.A. requiring transfers of real property to be made by written
instrument, and Section 78-12-7, U.C.A. giving the real property title holder a conclusive
presumption another's use of the title holder's property is permissive unless the claimant
proves compliance with the other specific adverse possession requirements of that statute.
For that reason and because of the vague and unsatisfactory nature of the boundary of
acquiescence, such doctrine should be abandoned in favor of determining claims to land,
which are not based on written conveyance/grants, under the principles of law pertaining
to written instruments and contracts and under the principles of the law of equitable
estoppel.

7. Brown's belated post trial motion to vacate the court's decision and grant
Brown a prescriptive easement of some kind as to Jorgensen's property could not be
granted under Rule 15(b) or otherwise because no prescriptive easement theory was tried,
recognized or even mentioned before or during the trial and the court's ruling was
directly only to Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim.
8. Since Jorgensen filed no cost memorandum, no final judgment for costs could
have been entered against Brown. Brown's assertion a costs judgment was entered
against him is in error.
9. Brown's not having objected below to the recital in the judgment that title to
Jorgensen's property was quieted in Jorgensen against anyone claiming through Brown,
Brown's objection presents no appealable issue. Such recital is harmless to Brown.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL, BEFORE TRIAL, OF BROWN'S
MOTION TO STRIKE JORGENSEN'S AFFIDAVIT DOES
NOT PRESENT AN APPEALABLE ISSUE.
Brown's vague argument that Judge Hilder should have stricken Jorgensen's
Affidavit (R. 113-120) filed in support of Jorgensen's Motion for Summary Judgment
and in opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Brown's
Motion for Summary Judgment is inexplicable. Both motions for summary judgment
were denied. (R. 281-283) Denial of a motion for summary judgment is nol a final,
hence appealable order. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359 (Utah
1997) md Jensen v. Nielsen, 447 P.2d 906 (Utah 1968).

Brown's brief does not purport to show, nor could it, that denial of Brown's
Motion to Strike/Denial of Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment infected the later
trial, before another judge, with any error of fact or law. Jorgensen's Affidavit was not
made a trial exhibit nor was it even referred to at the trial at which Jorgensen testified as
to the facts essentially as set forth in his affidavit with objections to part of his testimony
being sustained. (R. 429-480; Tr. 14-37; 170-208; 296-297)
Judge Hilder properly refused to strike Jorgensen's affidavit for the reasons set
forth in Jorgensen's memorandum filed March 7, 2002, (R. 266-272) which are stated in
footnote 3, pages 19-24 above.
Brown's argument that the trial court should have stricken Jorgensen's Affidavit
and granted Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment presents no final factual or legal
issue for this court to decide.
POINT II
SINCE BROWN'S BRIEF NEITHER MARSHALS THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NOR PURPORTS TO
FERRET OUT ANY BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE SAME TO BE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, THIS COURT IS TO ASSUME THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
The arguments made in Brown's brief, (pages 16-47) appear to attack the trial
court's findings of fact. However, Brown's brief neither marshals the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, nor does it purport to show they are clearly
erroneous/legally insufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. Therefore,
this court is to assume the evidence supports the findings. Awinc Corp, v. Simonsen, 112

P.3d 1228 (Utah App. 2005) and West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311
(UtahApp. 1991).
As set forth above, the eleven page single spaced Memorandum Decision made by
Judge Lubeck after the trial discussed Utah boundary by acquiescence cases, made
extensive detailed findings of fact, making numerous references to the details of the
evidence presented by both parties, and stated the court's conclusions of lav/, fully
showing just how and exactly why the court arrived at its final rulings, leaving nothing
whatsoever to speculation. (R. 481-492)
If anything, the overall tenor of the trial court's Memorandum Decision is strongly
favorable to Brown as the court could well have but did not find that Brown had not
actually "continually used" the property downhill from the fence for grazing livestock or
even genuinely thought it was his because of Brown's 1971 survey clearly showing the
property was not his and because Brown, by his own written statement stated the old
fence had fallen into a state of near total disrepair (Exhibit 15 and R. 155) only
replacing/repairing it and fencing Jorgensen out of the Ditch Road in 1995 after Brown
learned in 1994 of Jorgensen's subdividing/sales intent. (See R. 490; Tr. 16-17; 20-28;
34-37; Exhibit 15 and R. 155)
The court's basic findings that: 1) the old fence was for livestock control and not
intended as a property line boundary and; 2) that there was no evidence showing that
either Tracy or Jorgensen acknowledged the old fence as a property line was really
compelled by undisputed evidence that Jorgensen knew his property line was not the old
fence and the total lack of evidence as to how Tracy regarded the fence, as specifically
29

and extensively set forth in the trial court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision (R.
481-492). See pages 9-15 and 22-24 above.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE DOES NOT PERMIT
THE TAKING OF REAL PROPERTY BY MEANS OF AN ADJOINING
LANDOWNER'S USE THEREOF WITHOUT OBJECTION/OUSTER
Brown's insistently and repeatedly argued before, during and after trial and now
on appeal that Brown acquired Jorgensen's property below the old fence by whatever use
of it (or part of it) Brown may have made of it without objection from Tracy or
Jorgensen, insisting that lack of affirmative objection/ouster action on the part of
Tracy/Jorgensen equals legal binding "acquiescence" in the old fence as the parties
property line, thus presenting the legal issue of whether the trial court should have so
ruled.
Brown's argument assumes that recorded deeds and surveys, all showing the
property lines to be far away from the old fence are totally irrelevant; that the
landowner's personal understanding of the location of his property line, consistent with
the deeds, is totally irrelevant; that landowner's lack of actual personal awareness of use
made of his property and of how and unknown to the landowner claimant considers the
fence irrelevant and that whether a prior landowner considered an old fence to be a
livestock fence or a boundary line fence or even knew about its existence is also totally
irrelevant.
Utah's judicial doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has changed and been
confusingly inconsistent. A clarifying decision said the doctrine does not apply where

the recorded ownership deeds show the property line, hence "objective uncertainty" as to
the property line does not exist. Halladay v. Cluff 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). Then a
reversing decision was made to the effect that "objective uncertainty" does not need to be
shown for application of the doctrine. Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990).
Nonetheless, the cases do make clear that the "mutual acquiescence" element of
the doctrine requires evidence that both parties acknowledge a line; that bolh
acknowledge it by affirmative acts/words as the demarcation of their properties and that
any conversation/action on the part of the landowner showing the landowner does not
consider a line as his property line defeats application of the doctrine. Wilkinson Family
Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999) and Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781
(Utah 2002).
In Wilkinson Family Farm, Wilkinson claimed ownership of five acres of
Babcock's rural property lying on Wilkinson's side of a fence on the ground on the basis
of Wilkinson's use of the parcel for over twenty years for crops and grazing. As Brown
does here, Wilkinson argued "indolence" on the part of Babcock permitted Wilkinson's
long continued use to establish a boundary line acquiescence presumption against
Wilkinson in favor of Babcock. The trial court had quieted Babcock's record title in
Babcock because there had not been mutual acquiescence by both parties in the fence as
the demarcation of their properties. This court specifically disagreed with Wilkinson's
"indolence" argument, holding that "mere acquisition and use, without more, is
insufficient to establish boundary by acquiescence'' 993 P.2d 229, 232 (emphasis added)
and affirmed the trial court's decision, stating the actual purpose of the fence was
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relevant, noting that fences for livestock control, placement of irrigation ditches and other
purposes had been held in other cases not to constitute property ownership boundaries
because of lack of actual mutual intent that the fence be the ownership boundary.
Wilkinson cited Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (Utah 1972) with approval, a pre-Staker
v. Ainsworth case, which said that if there was no uncertainty as to the actual boundary
line, the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary is, establish a boundary by
acquiescence elsewhere. This court said that Wilkinson's knowledge of the actual
location of his property line was relevant since factual knowledge or available knowledge
makes the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence unavailable.
In Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002), language from which seems to have
been used in Judge Lubeck's Memorandum Decision, the Supreme Court clearly said that
if the claimant's evidence does not "satisfy any one of the four elements of the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence, the boundary is defeated." Ault quoted from Hales v.
Franks, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979): "Where there is no proof of acquiescence in the line
as the boundary, there can be no boundary by acquiescence" and "[T]he plaintiffs
occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient to establish defendant's
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary." Ault plainly states that".. .the party must show
that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building,
as the boundary of the adjacent parcels"; that "record property owners are not required to
take legal action or otherwise "oust" someone adversely occupying their property to
maintain their legal rights in their property" and that:

'They must only take some action manifesting that they do not acquiesce or
recognize the particular line, e.g. a fence, as a boundary between the properties.
Indeed, mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing
dispute as to the property line or an unwillingness by one of the adjoining
landowners to accept the land as the boundary refute any allegation that the parties
have mutually acquiesced in the line as the property demarcation... .Specifically,
conversations in which a record owner unequivocally informs the other that he
owns beyond the "visible line" claimed as a boundary, and that the owner does not
recognize that line as separating the properties, are conclusive that a party has not
acquiesced in the line as the property line." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah
2002)
Ault thus made it clear that if A allows B to use A's property without
objection/ouster action, even for twenty years or more, such alone does not legally justify
B in then taking legal ownership of A's property, over A's objection (sans deed,
compliance with the statute of frauds or payment of taxes.) Ault plainly means that
property owners are not legally obligated to find or eject trespassers, even continuing
trespassers, to prevent them from taking the landowner's property.
Judge Lubeck obviously correctly applied the principles enunciated and referred
to in Wilkinson and Ault to the facts of this case.
To reduce the mutual acquiescence in the line as a property ownership boundary
line factual proof element to merely proof of unilateral trespassing use without
objection/ouster on the part of the record title holder plus a trespasser's self-serving
assertions of personal belief of ownership, directly contrary to the written recorded deeds,
as here urged by Brown, would clearly impose a totally outrageous burden on
5

The reasoning and result reached in Ault really recognizes and enforces, without
expressly recognizing so, the statutory presumption that Section 78-27-7, U.C.A. (1953)
places on a trespassers use of property. The statute makes it clear that such has no effect
on title unless the trespasser has taken the additional action to acquire the property
(without a deed) specified by that statute.

landowners, especially relatively new owners of vacant rural land held for investment in
the context of ever changing land ownership and changing land uses. Deeds could no
longer be relied upon to prove ownership. Owners would have to repeatedly visit their
property to ascertain whether trespass was occurring (perhaps intermittently such as for
summertime grazing), whether or not any trespassing was damaging in anyway, then to
identify and chase off the trespasser, especially if the trespasser could be identified as an
owner of adjacent land, and/or to write letters and make records protesting trespasser's
use or of the granting them permissive use. And what if a litigant should convince the
court to judicially reduce the twenty year element to ten years? Five years? To impose
Brown's view of the law on landowners would subject subsequent landowners to the risk
of loss of perhaps even a substantial portion of paid for valuable ground6 to a trespasser
by reason of twenty + years ago unknowable historical actions/inactions of long deceased
predecessor title holders- in this case corporate owner, Tracy Land & Livestock
Company.
Jorgensen was an absentee landowner. (See Tr. 14) Jorgensen purchased for
investment. (Tr. 18 and 34) Jorgensen seldom visited his property and only became
aware in 1994 that it was Brown who owned adjoining property. (Tr. 16-17) Jorgensen
never even spoke to Brown until 1999. (Tr. 24; 186-188) Brown never did personally see
any grazing or other use of his property by Brown. (R. 116) Jorgensen did not become

The 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property sought by Brown included a strip of flat land
and the road along the irrigation ditch which provided access to the rest of the 195 acres
without which access Jorgensen testified he would never have purchased the property.
There was no other good access to the 195 acres of mountain property. (Tr. 195-196)

aware of Brown's new fencing and culverts until 1994. (Tr. 35) Jorgensen did not live on
or use his 195 acres, only occasionally visiting it so he was in no position to know the
nature or extent of Brown's current or historical trespassing use of Jorgensen's property.
Nor could Jorgensen have any knowledge about any thirty-forty-fifty year ago
conversations/deals, or lack of such, between predecessor adjoining property owners
respecting fences/irrigation ditch or anything else.
The change in the law urged by Brown would also constitute a wholly
unwarranted judicial repeal/amendment of the presumption set forth in Section 78-12-7,
U.C.A. (1953) which provides:
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been
possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held
and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action, (emphasis added)7
Adoption of Brown's position would also constitute wholly unwarranted judicial
repeal/amendment of Section 25-5-1 U.C.A. (1953) of Utah's statute of frauds which
expressly precludes creation/acquisition of interests in real property other thatn leases for
a term not exceeding one year except by written deed/conveyance subscribed by the party
creating/granting the interest.

7

Jorgensen asked the trial court to afford him the conclusive statutory presumption of the
legal effect of any use/occupancy of Jorgensen's property by Brown provided by Section
78-12-7 U.C.A. (R. 329) but the trial court ruled (erroneously Jorgensen contends) that
Section 78-12-7 only applies to adverse possession actions (R. 429)
8
Jorgensen asked the trial court to rule that the existence of Section 25-5-1 U.C.A.
(1953) of Utah's statute of frauds required Brown to prove that the location of the true

Jorgensen submits that the inherently vague judicial doctrine of boundary by
"acquiescence" is fundamentally flawed in its inexplicable total disregard of the policy,
purpose and language of both Section 78-12-7 and Section 25-5-1 U.C.A. and by its
unfortunate use of the vague words "occupancy" and "acquiescence." Unfortunately, the
doctrine encourages judicial hosting of the kind of expensive, and which should be totally
unnecessary, litigation of the kind demonstrated by this case.
Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999)
recognized the doctrine was founded in early cases in which landowners were actually
uncertain as to their property lines so established a visible physical boundary in
settlement of the issue. Jorgensen submits that any (now practically unnecessary due to
modern survey methods) need to make adjoining landowners who really could not
otherwise find their common boundary line abide by any defacto agreement establishing
it and any need to prevent a landowner from knowingly encouraging/watching while a
mislead neighbor puts expensive improvements on the landowner's property, which the
landowner later decides to appropriate, can and should be dealt with by application of the
principles embedded in contract/equitable estoppel law. There is no need whatsoever for
continuing the vague judicial doctrine of boundary by "acquiescence", ignoring in the
process Section 78-12-7 and 25-5-1, U.C.A., the fact land uses and land ownerships are

property lines was unknown, uncertain or indefinite and that such led the parties
respective previous co-terminus owners to agree upon and fix their common boundary
line without a conveyance because such an agreement would not be a conveyance
required to be in writing by Utah's statute of frauds (R. 328). However, the trial court
ruled (erroneously Jorgensen contends) that the Utah statute of frauds is inapplicable to a
boundary by acquiescence claim. (R. 428-429)

rapidly changing and the fact it is wholly unjust and inequitable to be saddling a new
landowner with the risk of what an adjoining landowner/his friends may claim were old
actions/inactions of a deceased/defunct previous title holder.9
Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim to almost seven acres of Jorgensen's
land should have been disposed of without trial by the court's granting Jorgensen's
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the long established consistent property
lines shown by the deeds of record and surveys.10
POINT IV
BROWN'S POST TRIAL MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT'S
RULING QUIETING TITLE IN JORGENSEN AND SEEKING A PRIVATE
EASEMENT OF SOME KIND IN JORGENSEN'S PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY
DENIED SINCE BROWN'S PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT THEORY WAS
NEITHER TRIED BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
NOR EVEN MENTIONED BY BROWN BEFORE OR DURING THE TRIAL.
Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P. permits amendments to the pleadings to be made to conform
to the evidence and rulings made by the trial court only when "issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties..." (emphasis added).

In this case, neither Brown nor Jorgensen or anyone else could know, what, if any,
conversations/dealings Brown's father/other Brown family members may have had with
Tracy Wright or any of his livestock foreman/employees. Did Brown's father complain
about Tracy's livestock coming down into his irrigation ditch/farm? Did Tracy then tell
Brown to fence them out? Did Tracy make a deal with Brown to lamb out Tracy's sheep
on the flat land and need a net wire fence to keep them there? Hire Brown to put up the
fence? Did Brown's father put up the fence to keep herds of cattle being put into and
pulled off the summer range/the canyon for overrunning Brown's property?
1
Brown erected no improvements of any kind on Jorgensen's property, only having
rebuilt the side hill fence and having constructed a wood fence cutting off Jorgensen's
access along the irrigation ditch in 1995 after he learned in 1994 of plans Jorgensen then
had to subdivide Jorgensen's property, including the portion thereof downhill from the
old hillside fence.

As the trial court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order denying Brown's post trial
motion (R. 565-573) makes abundantly clear, at no time prior to the trial in the
correspondence that passed between the parties, or in the pleadings, in the motions and
arguments pertaining thereto and at no time during the trial, or in opening arguments or
closing arguments was there any mention of Brown claiming any rights under the
doctrine of prescriptive easement.
Brown's post trial motion was not made in order to make Brown's pleadings
conform with the rulings made in the court's Memorandum Decision but for the purpose
of overturning the court's Memorandum Decision entirely upon a theory neither plead,
raised nor tried, as clearly shown by the entire record.
Brown's assertions that the parties presented evidence at trial relevant to elements
of prescriptive easement and that Brown's evidence established a prescriptive easement is
contrary to and finds no support in the record.
Browns' brief is bereft of any citation to any evidence in the record that Jorgensen
or Jorgensen's counsel expressly or impliedly consented to have the court consider a
prescriptive easement claim.
The trial record abundantly shows the case was plead, tried and determined solely
on Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim.11

If a prescriptive easement claim had been recognized at trial, there would have been
much in the trial record so showing since such a theory is directly opposed to Brown's
claim of fee simple title as it would have admitted Jorgensen's ownership and would have
required Brown to prove use hostile to Jorgensen and that such hostile use was known by
Jorgensen for an uninterrupted period of at least twenty years. The elements of

Browns' Rule 15(b) argument ignores the basic purpose of Rule 15(b) U.R.C.P.,
and similar rules in other jurisdictions, which is to permit pleadings to be amended post
trial "only when the effect will be to acknowledge that certain issues upon which the
lower court's decision has been based or issues consistent with the trial court's judgment
have been litigated." 6A Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1494 (p.
11, pocket part), (emphasis added)
The court's Memorandum Decision was certainly not based upon prescriptive
easement factual or legal issues. Prescriptive easement issues were not tried with
Brown's consent and Brown may well have avoided proceeding on that theory since to do
so would have involved Brown in testifying both that he thought he owned the property
and that he knew he did not own it but instead was using it in a manner hostile to
Jorgensen's title with Jorgensen's knowledge.
Express or implied consent to the trial of theories/issues not raised in the pleadings
must be plainly evident from the trial record itself. Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409
(Utah 1998). In that case the court upheld the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to
amend stating that defendant "did not expressly or impliedly consent to try the contract
issue by merely mentioning the contract in his reply memorandum." Archuleta
emphasized the point that evidence claimed to be relevant to the proposed amendment
must be introduced in such manner that it is clear that both parties understood the

prescriptive easement and the elements of boundary by acquiescence are necessarily
mutually exclusive.

evidence was aimed at the unplead issue, citing Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah
App. 1987).
The purpose of Rule 15(b) permitting amendments to conform to the proof is to
align the pleadings to conform to the issues actually tried and determined and not to
permit the raising of issues only inferentially suggested by incidental evidence in the
record. Cole v. Layrite Products Company, 439 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1971).
Brown asserts he presented evidence supporting his prescriptive easement theory.
When evidence is introduced to support basic issues already pleaded and raised, in
this case boundary by acquiescence, the opposing party may not be conscious of its
possible relevance to claims/issues which have not been raised by the pleadings.
Therefore, the relevance of such evidence to unplead claims/issues must be made clear
at trial. 6A Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1493 (p. 19-35).
Post trial amendment is not permitted when such would change the liability sought
to be enforced against the defendant Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167 (Utah 1954) and
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919, cited in Wells. Brown's
proposed amendment impermissibly sought such.
This case had been pending for over three years and fully tried. That fact alone
together with the fact that Jorgensen would have suffered unavoidable prejudice by the
requested amendment required denial of Brown's motion. Kelly v. Utah Power & Light,
746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987).
Post trial Rule 15(b) motions cannot be granted when the amendment would cause
prejudice to the opposing party, where sought in bad faith, where such would be futile or

would create undue delay. l2 Madeja v. Olympic Packers, LLC, 310 F.3d 628 (9th Cir.
2002).
The pleading amendment cases cited in Brown's brief do not support Brown's
position.13

12

The rules, including those pertaining to post judgment motions, create no entitlement to
relief based on issues not squarely presented and squarely litigated at trial. A judgment
may be based on an unplead issue only when consent to trial of the issue is evident from
the record itself. No judgment may be based on issues not presented in the pleadings and
not tried with the express or actual implied consent of the parties as shown by the record.
An implied consent under Rule 15(b) will not be found if defendant v/ill be prejudiced.
Prejudice exists when the defendant had no notice of the new issue, where the defendant
could have offered additional evidence in defense or if the defendant in some other way
was denied a fair opportunity to defend. Cioffe v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539, 541-542 (11 th
Cir. 1982). It must affirmatively appear both parties clearly understood evidence was
offered for the purpose of aiming it at the unplead issue. MBIMotor Company, Inc. v.
Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974) Many cases are to the same effect. See
Monodv. Futura, Inc. 415 F.2d 1170 (10th 1969); and American Nat. Bank v. Federal
Dep. Ins. Corp. 710 F.2d 1528 (11 th Cir. 1983). American held that even had counsel
clearly articulated an unplead issue in closing arguments, still the opposing party had not
consented to the litigation thereof as it was never afforded an opportunity to present
evidence on that issue. In Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 249 F.3d 215 (4th Cir.
2001) the Court held that the pleadings, motions and orders of the trial court establish the
parameters of a case and the issues which were "tried' and that it is only the issues which
were actually tried that can be treated as if raised in the pleadings via Rule 15(b). The
actual record is depositive. Here it is abundantly clear that the only issue tried was
whether the old fence constituted a boundary by acquiescence.
13
In Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 91A P.2d 288 (Utah 1999) an objection
had been raised at trial that the court should not consider an illegality defense not alleged
and there had been no motion to amend. The court held that the trial court abused its
discretion when it entered a directed verdict holding a contract was illegal when that issue
had not been plead and without considering whether amendment of the pleadings to
conform to the evidence was even permissible and that it was necessary for the trial court
to first determine whether the parties had in fact tried the illegality issue by express or
implied consent. In England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977), the court said that a
trial court has only limited discretion to grant an amendment of pleadings to conform to
evidence adduced at trial and must first find a) that presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved by amendment and b) that admission of the evidence would not
prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.

The trial court very properly applied the law denying Brown's Motion to Amend
Pleadings, Vacate the Court's Memorandum Decision and for Prescriptive Easement as
abundantly and specifically set forth in the trial court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order
(R. 565-568, Addendum IV hereto) discussed on pages 16-18 and 27 above.
POINT V
JORGENSEN HAVING FILED NO COST MEMORANDUM, THERE IS NO
APPEALABLE FINAL JUDGMENT FOR COSTS AGAINST BROWN.
Brown makes a curious, totally pointless lack of cost memorandum argument- a
lack that obviously benefited Brown, asserting "The award of costs granted to
Jorgensen.. .should.. .be deemed invalid."
No award of costs could have been entered by the clerk against Brown as the
predicate cost memorandum was never filed and costs are allowable only in the amounts
and in the manner provided by law. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
How can Brown complain of their being no actual entry of a cost judgment in any
amount against Brown?
There is no appellate court jurisdiction over an order not constituting a final
judgment. R.H.D. v. S.F., 969 P.2d 947 (Utah App. 1998)

In Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998) the court affirmed the
trial court's denial of Fishbaugh's Rule 15(a) motion to amend filed forty-four days
before the scheduled trial date, which had already been twice continued, the trial judge
having stated he did not intend to continue it again. Fishbaugh had known he might have
a claim against the city for defective signing, but had failed to state the claim in his
amended complaint. The trial court had found Salt Lake City would not have an
opportunity to defend against the claim before trial.

POINT VI
NO APPEALABLE ISSUE IS PRESENTED BY THE TOTALLY HARMLESS TO
BROWN STATEMENT IN THE JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN
JORGENSEN FREE AND CLEAR OF THE CLAIMS OF BROWN AND OF ALL
PERSONS WHO MAY CLAIM UNDER BROWN SINCE BROWN DID NOT
COMPLAIN OF THAT TO THE TRIAL COURT.
Neither Brown's written objections to the proposed judgment (R. 493-500) nor
Brown's June 15, 2004 Post Trial Motion (R. 535-537) nor Brown's July 12, 2004 oral
argument included any objection to any language in the judgment quieting title against
Brown and anyone claiming under Brown, hence any such issue was not preserved for
appeal. Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1996) and Coleman v. Stevens, 17
P.3d 1122 (Utah 2000).
The recital in the judgment quieting title against all claims and persons who may
claim under Brown might be argued to be redundant since Brown obviously could not
pass on anything he did not own, and apparently has not purported to do so.
Nevertheless, such recital is harmless and inconsequential to Brown.
CONCLUSION
The court should affirm the August 2, 2004 Judgment Quieting Title 1o Real
Property in Lee Jorgensen and Directing Removal of Fences/Fence Improvements.
The court should affirm the July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order denying Brown's June
15, 2004 Post Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence; Motion to
Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Memorandum
Decision.

The court should, in the interest of rectifying changing decisional confusion
respecting the vague doctrine of boundary by acquiescence:
1. Recognize the unreasonable burden placed on landowners, particularly new
landowners, by the vague, changing, wholly judicial doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, and rule that such doctrine contradicts and runs counter to both statute of
frauds Section 25-5-1 U.C.A., requiring transfers of real property to be written, and the
presumption of permissive use in favor of record title holders explicitly set forth in
Section 78-12-7 U.C.A.
2. Rule that because application of the judicial doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence violates those statutes, such doctrine no longer exists in Utah and that the
more clearly defined statutory and common law principles of law which apply to deeds
and written contracts and principles of equitable estoppel law are sufficient to more
properly address claims to land of the kind which are being asserted under the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of September, 2005.
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ADDENDUM I
September 22, 2003 Ruling and Order (R. 424-430)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and
MARILYN R. BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 010600152

vs,
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10,
and other persons unknown claiming
title or interest in the subject
property of this action,
Defendant.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DATE: September 22, 2003

The above matter is before the court for decision on Lee
Jorgensen's (Defendant) motion in limine and for determination of
legal relevance of deeds and maps and other evidence of deed
lines and for other relief (motion in limine).
BACKGROUND
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary
line. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs)
sole claim is that they have acquired the property under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Approximately 53 years
ago, Thomas E. Brown, J r / s father erected a fence on Defendant's
predecessor's property, in effect appropriating 6.94 acres of
that property. On May 30, 2001, Plaintiffs filed this law suit
to quiet title in the property.
On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert K. Hilder,
granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the third and
fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence standard.
Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of law the
boundary was established for a long period of time, namely 53
years, and that the boundary was established by adjoining
landowners, namely Plaintiffs' predecessors. In the court's June
28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the remaining issues
for trial are the first two prongs of the boundary by
acquiescence standard, which are (I) occupation up to a visible
line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and ( n ) mutual
acquiescence m the line as a boundary.

On May 28, 2003, Defendant filed the present motion in
limine.
On July 28, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to
Defendant's motion in limine.
On September 12, 2003, Defendant filed his repLy to
Plaintiffs' opposition and notice to submit for decision.
oral argument was requested by either party.

No

DISCUSSION
Defendant requests the court (1) declare the burden of proof
to show boundary by acquiescence is on Plaintiffs, (2) conclude
that Plaintiffs' testimony regarding his father's state of mind
is irrelevant and/or inadmissible hearsay, (3) conclude that
Plaintiffs' admission of Defendant's title and the written
evidence of the party's respective titles to their adjoining
property is relevant and admissible, (4) Plaintiffs' claLm is
barred by the statute of frauds, (5) conclude that Plaintiffs
have insufficient evidence to overcome the Utah Code Ann § 7812-7 presumption that Defendant has legal possession of the
property and (6) grant partial summary judgment quieting title to
Defendant's 6.94 acre parcel in Defendant.
Defendant's motion raises several issues for the court to
consider and decide, specifically, (1) which party bears the
burden of proof to show boundary by acquiescence, (2) whether
Plaintiffs' testimony regarding his father's state of mind is
irrelevant and/or inadmissible hearsay, (3) whether Defendant's
recorded title is dispositive or Plaintiffs' claim, (4) whether
the statute of frauds applies to a boundary by acquiescerce
claim, (5) whether § 78-12-7 provides conclusive presumption that
Defendant possessed his property and Plaintiffs use was
subordinate to his and (6) whether quiet title may be decided in
this motion in limine.
I
Burden of Proof
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
his case of boundary by acquiescence by clear and convincing
evidence. Citing
12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries 104.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the burden of proof for
a boundary by acquiescence case is preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, in determining which party bears the burden of proof in
a boundary by acquiescence action, the Utah Supreme Court held
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that the burden of proof could be placed upon either party
depending on the specific facts of each case. Citing
Halladay
Cluff,
685 P.2d 500, 507 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ( o v e r r u l e d on
different
grounds
by Staker
v. Ainsworth,
785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990)).

v.

Once a prima facie
case is made for the party asserting
title ownership of the property, in order to establish a boundary
by acquiescence other than the boundary as thus shown, the burden
of proof is with that party claiming boundary by acquiescence.
Nelson
v. Da Rouch, 50 P.2d 273 (Utah 1935). 1 "The doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence has always been very restrictively
applied. Since it operates to take from the fee owner a small
strip of his land, it has never been given broad application."

Halladay
Howe).

v. Cluff,

supra,

685 P.2d at 508 {dissenting

Justice

Here, the parties concede that record title reflects
Defendant as the owner of the disputed property. Based on public
policy of record title and the restrictive application of
boundary by acquiescence, the court is not inclined to leave the
burden of proof with Defendant. Defendant has met his initial
burden. The burden has shifted to Plaintiffs, who now bear the
burden of showing boundary by acquiescence. Not only is this
consonant with the policy of record title and boundary by
acquiescence, the strip of land here is greater that a small
strip and indeed can hardly be considered a "strip." The court,
therefore, is persuaded to leave the burden of proof with
Plaintiffs as the party claiming boundary by acquiescence.
Because this is a civil case and Defendant has failed to provide
Utah support for his contention that a clear and convincing
standard applies, the court concludes that the burden of proof is
by the preponderance of the evidence.
II
State of Mind Evidence
Defendant claims that Thomas E. Brown, Jr.'s (Brown)
testimony regarding his father's intent in erecting the fence is

1

In Ault v. Holdenr
44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002), the court
stated that "If the party attempting to establish boundary by
acquiescence fails to satisfy any one of the elements of the
doctrine, the boundary is defeated." This language indicates
that the full burden is on the party claiming boundary by
acquiescence. Even if this is the applicable standard and there
is no initial burden on Defendant, the burden is still with
Plaintiffs.
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irrelevant and/or hearsay and therefore should not be admissible.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Brown's testimony is
admissible because he has personal knowledge of the matter.
Specifically, Brown assisted his father in building the fence and
had the opportunity and capacity to perceive the events and
circumstances surrounding the construction of the fence.
Moreover, Brown's testimony is admissible pursuant to the ancient
boundary exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically, Utah R.
Evid. 803(20) is based upon the longstanding doctrine that allows
the admission of hearsay evidence to prove the location of an
ancient corner or boundary line. Statements of Brown's father
were made many years before the controversy arose and the fence
has a community reputation as the boundary between the
properties, therefore, the hearsay exception is met.
For the court to decide what Brown may testify to here would
be premature, as is most often the case concerning motions in
limine. The court will be in a better situation to do so at
trial. There is an insufficient basis to disallow Brown's
testimony altogether and there are insufficient facts to show
exactly what statements Defendant seeks to have excluded. The
court concludes that during trial the court will consider the
parties objections to specific statements during Brown's
testimony and decide those objections at that time.
Ill
Record Title
Defendant argues that his recorded deed should be admissible
and establishes Defendant's title to the property. Furthermore,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' boundary by acquiescence
evidence is legally insufficient as a matter of law as argued in
Defendant's previous briefs.
Plaintiffs admit that Defendant's recorded deed reflects
that he owns the property. Nevertheless, they argue that
Defendant's recorded deed is irrelevant to their boundary by
acquiescence claim because they do not need to show Defendant's
title to prove boundary by acquiescence. Moreover, Defendant's
legal insufficiency claim was decided previously by Judge
Hilder.
Utah R. Evid. R. 401 provides that relevant evidence is
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
The court concludes that Defendant's recorded deed is
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relevant. Plaintiffs would not need to prove a boundary by
acquiescence claim if Defendant's deed did not show that the
property was his. Clearly, the deed has a tendency to make the
existence of Defendant's ownership more probable than his
ownership would be without the deed. Moreover, as Plaintiffs
state: "notwithstanding record title, an owner is estopped from
claiming title because such owner acquiesced in the fence as the
boundary line for a long period of time." The "notwithstanding
record title" language indicates that to have a boundary by
acquiescence claim there must be a record title holder that the
boundary claimant is opposing.
The court, however, agrees with Plaintiffs regarding
Defendant's legal sufficiency claim. The third and fourth prongs
of boundary by acquiescence have been decided in Plaintiffs favor
as a matter of law. The first and second prongs of the test
remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs' evidence in support of
those prongs will be decided at trial.
IV
Statute of Frauds
Defendant next claims that Plaintiffs' boundary by
acquiescence claim is barred by the statute of frauds, Utah Code
Ann. § 25-5-1. Specifically, Defendant argues that the statute
of frauds precludes creation/acquisition of interests in real
property other than leases for a term not exceeding one year
except by written deed/conveyance subscribed by the party
creating/granting the interest. Here, there is no writing and
Plaintiffs fail to prove that the location of the true line was
unknown, uncertain or in dispute. Therefore, the Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs' boundary by acquiescence claim cannot
prevail.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of frauds
is irrelevant and inapplicable in a boundary by acquiescence
action. In support, Plaintiffs argue that the Utah appellate
courts have affirmed several cases based on boundary by
acquiescence without written instruments, therefore, the doctrine
clearly supercedes the statutes of frauds. Citing
Orton
v.
Carter,
970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998)(affirming
trial court decision
finding that the elements of boundary by acquiescence were
established and there was no written instrument.); see
also
Staker
v. Ainsworth,
785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990)(same); Mason v.
Loveless,
24 P.3d 997 (Utah App. 2001) (same) .
The court agrees with Plaintiffs. Although those cases do
not specifically address the statute of frauds, this court is
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controlled by previous cases. Those cases
acquiescence claims have succeeded without
requirements of the statute of frauds. The
therefore, that the statute of frauds does
by acquiescence claims.

show that boundary by
meeting the
court concludes,
not apply to boundary

V
UCA § 78-12-7
Defendant claims that § 78-12-7 provides a conclusive
presumption that Defendant possessed his property and that any
use thereof by Plaintiffs was under and in subordination to
Defendant's legal title. Specifically, Defendant argues that all
the elements of adverse possession must be shown to rebut the
presumption of possession raised in the record title holder by
§ 78-12-7. Defendant argues, therefore, that it is presumed that
Defendant possessed his property and Plaintiffs used it with
Defendant's permission.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of adverse
possession is inapplicable in a boundary by acquiescence case.
This court agrees with Plaintiffs.
Section 78-12-7 relates to adverse possession. The
Plaintiffs have not raised adverse possession as a claim. The
sole claim is boundary by acquiescence. The court refuses to
apply any presumption that applies to adverse possession to
boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiescence is a
different and distinct doctrine from adverse possession.
VI
Quiet Title by Motion in Limine
Defendant requests the court declare quiet title in
Defendant. This is an improper procedural device to declare
quiet title. Moreover, the court, Judge Robert K.
Hilder,
already decided that there are genuine issues of material fact
with regard to the first and second prongs of boundary by
acquiescence. Therefore, the court may not quiet title in
Defendant without a trial.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
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order is required
DATED this (_^_

day of

5&cf- ,

2003

BY THE COURT:
U
u

/

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDG
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ADDENDUM II
April 7,2004 Memorandum Decision (R. 481-491)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and
MARILYN R. BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 010600152

vs.
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10,
and other persons unknown claiming
title or interest in the subject
property of this action,
Defendant.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DATE: Aoril 7, 2004

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
March 31 and April 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were present with James C.
Jenkins and Defendant was present with Ray G. Martineau and David
S. Cook.
BACKGROUND
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary
line. On May 30, 2001, plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and
Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint seeking an order
that they are the fee simple owners of certain land. They claim
to be the sole owners because they have acquired the property
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The issue is
straight-forward. Defendant owns the disputed land by deed and
all recorded instruments. Approximately 53 years ago, Thomas E.
Brown, Jr.'s father erected a fence on Defendant's predecessor's
property and plaintiff and his predecessors have been using the
property since then under the belief that the fence was in fact
the recorded property line. It was not, and so the issue is
whether that use now amounts to acquiring the property under the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
On June 14, 2001, defendant answered and filed a
counterclaim seeking to quiet title in the property. Defendant
claims to be the record owner of the disputed property.
The parties filed motions for summary judgment and partial
summary judgment. On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert
K.
Hilder,
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs

on the third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence
standard. Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of
law the boundary was established for a long period of time,
namely 53 years, and that there were adjoining properties. In the
court's June 28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the
remaining issues for trial are the first two prongs of the
boundary by acquiescence standard, which are (i) occupation up to
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (ii)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.
Defendant filed motions in limine in May, 2003, and the
court issued its ruling on- September 22, 2003.
The court ruled
that the burden is on Plaintiffs, who now bear the burden of
showing boundary by acquiescence and that the burden of proof is
by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also ruled it
was premature for the court to decide what Brown may testify to
concerning specific statements. The court concluded that
Defendant's recorded deed is relevant as Plaintiffs would not
need to prove a boundary by acquiescence claim if Defendant's
deed did not show that the property was his but the first and
second prongs of the test remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs'
evidence in support of those prongs will be decided at trial.
The court also determined that boundary by acquiescence claims
may proceed without meeting the requirements of the statute of
frauds and that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary
by acquiescence claims. The court also ruled UCA 78-12-7 relates
to adverse possession and does not apply to boundary by
acquiescence claims. The court refused to apply any presumption
that applies to adverse possession to boundary by acquiescence.
The court also refused to quiet title without trial.
At the close of plaintiffs' case defendant moved for a
directed verdict under URC-P, Rule 50. The court believes that
when the trial is to the court the proper motion is under Rule
41(b), a motion for a dismissal claiming plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court took that matter under advisement and
allowed defendant to present his evidence.
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised.
LAW
The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
is confusing. The issues are between two adversaries and each
has interests that are worthwhile. On one side is the desirable
feature of being able to turn to recorded instruments to
determine property rights and boundaries. On the other side is
2

the also desirable principle of allowing the peace and good order
of society to be served by leaving at rest possible disputes over
boundaries where there has been a recognizable physical boundary
accepted as such for a long time period. This case highlights
those two worthy, competing interests between what appear to the
court to be good and decent people.
It is the policy of Utah law under the cases to apply the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence restrictively, though it is
not unjust in some circumstances to require property owners to
live with what they and their predecessors have long acquiesced
in.
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property on the
basis of boundary by acquiescence the party claiming title under
the doctrine must establish (1) occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period
of time, and (iv) by adjoining landowners. If the party claiming
title under the doctrine fails to establish any one of the
elements the boundary is defeated. The court, the Honorable
Robert
K. Hilder,
has previously ruled that the final two
elements have been established by undisputed testimony. To show
mutual acquiescence plaintiffs must show both parties recognized
and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties acknowledge
the line as a demarcation between the properties. Both parties
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary
line. This element serves the useful and practical purpose where
the parties are seemingly content to recognize a marked line as a
practical boundary between them. When the parties acquiesce they
are precluded from claiming the boundary line is not the true
line. The landowner must recognize and treat an observable line
such as a fence as the boundary dividing the properties. The
acquiescence may be tacit or inferred from evidence. Even mere
conversation between parties evidencing an ongoing dispute or an
unwillingness by one to accept the line refutes the allegation of
mutual acquiescence. The purpose of a fence is relevant and may
be considered and may be determinative because both parties must
acknowledge a particular line to be the dividing line. If the
fence was not intended as a boundary there cannot be acquiescence
in that fence as a boundary line. If a fence is built for
livestock control or some other purpose and not as a boundary, it
is not a boundary by acquiescence. Occupation of land up to a
fence is not sufficient if the adverse owner does not acquiesce
in the fence as a boundary. Evidence of knowledge of recorded
deeds and instrument is not relevant in a boundary by
acquiescence case. See Ault v. Holden,
44 P.3d 181 (Utah
2002);
Edgell
v. Canning,
916 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999);
Wilkinson
Family
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Farm v. Babcock,
993 P. 2d 229
Ainsworth,
785 P.2d 417 (Utah

(Utah App.
1990).

1999) ; Staker

v.

The court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in
Summit County. The parties land is called the Brown parcel and
the Jorgensen parcel. The parcels are off what is called Brown's
Canyon Road, Highway 196, between Highway 32 and Highway 40.
2. Near the north border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence
which runs along what is now the disputed boundary in a
Southeasterly direction, roughly along the Southern border of the
Brown parcel. It runs from Highway 196, commonly known as Brown's
Canyon Road, to a point approximately 580 feet from the road,
then turns more easterly and runs toward the Weber River for
approximately 1200 additional feet. See exhibit 10 for the most
accurate showing of the property lines established by deed as
well as the fence and ditch relevant to this case.
3. The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas
Brown, T. Edward Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946,
though there is some testimony it was built before that.
Plaintiff helped his father build the fence, a cedar post and net
and barbed wire fence that requires maintenance and repair on a
regular basis. The fence has remained in the same basic position
since that time, but plaintiffs have repaired and replaced some
of it as recently as the mid-1990s. There has been ongoing wire
replacement and the first approximately 580 feet from the road
have been replaced completely in the mid 1990s, but the old cedar
posts were left in place. The fence has been observable since its
construction, though at various points it may have been leaning
down or covered by sagebrush in places. Defendant testified
contrary to that visibility, but the court, based on several
other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained
observable and open since the mid 1940s. Several neighbors and
friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had
been in the area and recall the fence from the 1940s.
4. The recorded deeds and plats show that the fence goes
across the Jorgensen parcel and encloses approximately 6.94 acres
of land that is shown on the deeds and plats and by certified
surveys as belonging to Jorgensen. That area is the "subject
property." There is no question that the fence is on land deeded
to and platted as belonging to Jorgensen since 1979. The
recorded property lines are not disputed by plaintiffs. In 1979
4

Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel
and the partnership dissolved in 1986 and defendant acquired the
parcel from the partnership and has owned it solely since 1986.
The land was acquired, through a title company, from Tracy Land
and Livestock (Tracy) who owned that land and much more in the
area since the mid 1940s.
5. T. Edward Brown died in 1951 and plaintiffs'' family took
over the land and have used it to graze cattle and grow hay and
other crops since 1951. Plaintiffs took title in some of that
property, approximately 17 acres, in 1971, and that property is
now known herein as the Brown parcel. He built a house on a
portion of the approximately 17 acre parcel deeded to him. The
fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line
and plaintiff believed fully that the fence was the property line
to his property and has believed that since the fence was built,
even before plaintiff took title to his 17 acre parcel in 1971.
Before building the house, plaintiffs commissioned a survey which
was done by metes and bounds, performed by Bush and Gudgell.
That document shows in fact the same as the recorded instruments,
before and after 1971, that in fact the property line was not the
fence line. Plaintiff was legally aware of that metes and bounds
survey but did not understand it showed a property line different
from the fence line constructed by his father in the 1940s. His
subjective intent and belief, which the court finds was not
unreasonable, was that the fence erected by his father was his
property line.
6. As shown more fully on exhibit 10, the fence line is up
hill from plaintiff's true property line. Defendant's property,
where it adjoins plaintiffs' property, is largely barren and
hilly and mostly sagebrush. Below that fence plaintiff and his
family have used the property to graze cattle and sheep. There
is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and improved
which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has
also caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing
culverts. Below that ditch there is a drop off toward the
plaintiff property. The fence runs from the Brown's Canyon road
up the hill, southeasterly, and then toward the river. At about
580 feet, it turns more easterly, toward the Weber River. No one,
neither defendant nor his predecessors, have attempted to use or
occupy the property below the fence line. The fence runs
approximately 1900 feet, or .3 of a mile, and if considered as
belonging to plaintiff, adds property consisting of 6.94 acres to
plaintiff's 17 acre parcel. At the road, the fence is
approximately 167 feet from the true property line, that distance
expands to approximately 250 feet approximately 500 feet from the
road, and it then decreased to approximately 69 feet at the far
5

south end. It is thus a "strip" of property somewhat irregular
but averaging perhaps 175 feet wide and it is approximately 1900
feet in length. That 6.94 acres is the disputed property. An
irrigation ditch is in the strip, and that ditch originates at
the river and flows northward, obviously downhill, toward the
road and then under the road.
7. On or about July 1, 1999, defendant wrote a note to
plaintiffs telling them they had built a fence on defendant's
land and it should be removed. Since at least that time the
boundary line has been in dispute. Plaintiff immediately
contacted defendant and they attempted to resolve the issue but
were not able to do so. Plaintiff commissioned a survey shortly
after that contact. That informal survey is consistent with the
1971 metes and bounds survey that was accomplished so plaintiffs
could build their home. Plaintiff was originally told in 1994
that in fact the true property line probably ran through his
home, but that was in error and the true line, as shown on
Exhibit 10, is west of plaintiff's home. Plaintiffs have refused
to remove the fence and filed this action to guiet title
asserting the disputed land is owned by them under the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence.
8. Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He
inspected the property and observed fence posts but the court
finds the fence was visible. Defendant at that time was not
aware by survey of the exact and true boundary line but he
assumed the line was below the fence and irrigation ditch and
utilized what he believed was a "road" on his property just below
the irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to
his property. In fact the court finds it was not a "road" but
was used to work along the irrigation ditch. It could be
accessed from Brown's Canyon road but a fence and gate from
Brown's property ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet
from the road as shown on exhibit 10.
9. The predecessors of defendant ran livestock on the land.
There is no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its
existence. There was no evidence adduced whatever that Tracy
used or occupied the land on the downhill side of the fence.
10. Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that
area of the ditch but the court finds that was not occupation of
the land.
11. Defendant, in anticipation of possible buyers of some of
his land, commissioned a survey in 1994, and that survey showed
that the true line was not the fence line. Defendant always

6

believed the true line was not the fence, which he claims he did
not even see except for a few old leaning cedar posts, but that
the boundary line was downhill by the ditch and by the Brown home
where it was marked with a flag when defendant first inspected
it. The survey he commissioned in 1994 showed he was correct
about the true boundary line, that it was not the fence line.
The surveys are consistent with all the recorded instruments and
show the true boundaries as shown on Exhibit 10. That survey was
done by one France, who talked with plaintiff about the results
of that survey, along with the real estate broker McPhie. France
told plaintiff that plaintiff's house was probably partly on the
Jorgensen property. That was incorrect, but plaintiff was told
that.
12. Plaintiff erected a wooden rail fence along the Brown's
Canyon Road, to replace a wire fence across the front of his
property, but ran it across the nroad" or disputed approximate
167 feet to the disputed fence in the late 1990s. Plaintiff does
not call that area by the ditch, the disputed area, a "road" but
the court finds vehicles could drive onto it before the wooden
rail fence was installed, though it was not intended as a road.

ISSUES
Here, as found, each party operated in good faith. In
actual fact the true boundary line was as shown on the recorded
records, deeds and plats. There was a 1971 survey that showed
the fence was NOT the boundary line, but that was not understood
by plaintiff. Thus, the issue becomes difficult for the court.
That is especially so since two recent appellate court decisions
are somewhat in conflict. There are recorded documents and
surveys showing actual boundary lines. The parties are
constructively charged with that knowledge, thus each party knew
the boundary line and there was no legal uncertainty though there
was practical uncertainty by plaintiff. Defendant then did
nothing, by word or deed, to object to a visible fence. The
issue thus becomes whether that inaction as to a fence, which was
erected for a purpose not shown by the evidence, but by inference
was erected not to establish a boundary line but for some other
purpose, amounts to mutual acquiescence in that fence as a

boundary.
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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1. Plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of the true
property line since they commissioned a survey in 1971. Prior
deeds and documents showed the true boundary line as well. Those
instruments showed that the true property line, according to
deeds and plats and surveys, was not the fence line constructed
by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff believed, however, that the
fence line was the demarcation of the property line.
2. Defendant is the record title owner of the disputed land.
He also had constructive knowledge of the true property line at
least since 1994 when he commissioned a survey of his property.
He had constructive knowledge since 1979 when he obtained a deed
with the property description. That 1994 survey showed the
property line not to be where the fence was but the true property
line was according to the deeds and plats of record.
3. Plaintiff has operated under the assumption that the
fence constructed in the 1940s by his father was in fact the
property line.
4. The fence has been open and notorious and visible since
the 1940s. It has on occasion been in disrepair but has been an
observable fence since that time.
5. Plaintiff used and occupied the land as if it were his
and was open and notorious about that use. The fence has served
as an observable and open boundary for a long period of time
between two adjoining land owners. The topography and terrain
made the fence placement a practical place to erect a fence as it
would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land,
until the home was built in 1971. Given the slope and the
irrigation ditch and the terrain in the area the court infers and
concludes that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock
and keep grazing livestock of the predecessor owner from the
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line
demarcating the property. There has been occupation of the land
by plaintiffs up to the fence. There has been no occupation by
defendant or his predecessors below or east of that fence.
Defendant's occupation, and that of his predecessors, has been
only up to that disputed fence.
6. There was no mutual acquiescence in the open boundary
line of the fence. This area is rural and defendant visited only
on occasion as he bought the land for investment purposes. He
purchased 195 acres and had possible plans to subdivide the area.
There was no acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Defendant
did not take any action to oust plaintiff and remained silent as
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relates to plaintiff until 1999. However, defendant did
commission a survey in 1994. To the court that indicates a lack
of acquiescence. If acquiescence is, in the words of Ault v.
Holden, "where adjoining landowners are seemingly content to
recognize a marked line or monument not on the true line as the
practical boundary between them," then the hiring of a survey to
the court conveys the opposite of acquiescence. If defendant
believed and acquiesced in the notion that the fence was the
boundary, he would not have commissioned a survey in this rural
area. That act, though not conveyed directly to plaintiff, shows
a lack of acquiescence. That act showed an unwillingness to
accept the fence as the property line. In fact, however, even if
the surveyor, Wallace France, was not an agent of defendant, that
fact of obtaining the survey was conveyed to plaintiff. Moreover,
the court concludes it need not have been conveyed to the
opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or
unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line.
Plaintiffs have to prove mutual acquiescence by a preponderance
of the evidence. Plaintiff argued that unless defendant conveyed
that lack of acquiescence to plaintiff there was acquiescence.
The court disagrees. While most cases evidently show a dispute by
a direct communication with the opposing landowner, the court
concludes that any actions that show an unwillingness to
acknowledge the fence as a boundary are sufficient to defeat the
doctrine. The acquiescence includes plaintiff demonstrating that
both parties "recognized and acknowledged" a visible line. Ault
v. Holden, 44 P. 3d at 13.
Defendant's actions in commissioning a
survey were inconsistent with an "acknowledgment" that the fence
was the property line. There seems to be no good reason that the
lack of acknowledgment is only effective if conveyed to the
opposing landowner. The doctrine requires that there be an
actual acknowledgment, and that the parties treat the fence as a
common boundary between the properties. Telling others that the
fence is not the boundary, or hiring a surveyor, seems to the
court to defeat the idea that there is an acknowledgment in a
boundary line. As mentioned, moreover, here plaintiff was aware
in 1994 there was a dispute when France and McPhie talked to him
about the property line being other than at the disputed fence
line.
Further, the seeming inaction of defendant was not shown to
be a tacit approval of the fence as boundary line. The inaction
of defendant and his predecessors was acquiescence in the fence
line for some purpose, but plaintiff has not shown it was an
acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line.
The court believes plaintiff's arguments seek to in effect
reduce the elements of boundary by acquiescence from four to
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three. Simple occupation of land, up to a visible fence or
boundary, without more, is not acquiescence. Though acquiescence
may be tacit, it must be more than has been shown here by
plaintiff.
As to the predecessor acquiescing, the court rejects
plaintiff's arguments in that regard. First, plaintiff must show
acquiescence, which requires a showing that the other landowner,
defendant's predecessor Tracy, "recognized and acknowledged" the
visible line. There may be an inference that Tracy, running
livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let
alone acknowledged it as a boundary line. The four elements do
not overlap. Failure to occupy by Tracy, coupled with occupation
by plaintiff, does not amount to acknowledgment the fence is a
boundary.
7, The boundary by acquiescence elements have not been met.
There has been occupation of the land by plaintiffs up to B
visible mark (fence) for a long period of time, over 20 years, by
adjoining land owners, but plaintiffs have not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was mutual acquiescence
by the parties in that fence as the boundary line. Defendant
failed to oust plaintiff, but did not agree that the fence was
the boundary. Moreover, given the court's conclusion about the
action of defendant in 1994 amounting to a dispute because of a
failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there has not even
been an undisputed period of 20 years since defendant's
ownership.
The court indicated the recent cases are confusing. In
Wilkinson,
a Court of Appeals decision, the court said
specifically that knowledge of the true boundary is not
irrelevant. However, that court then quoted language from a case
that has in effect been overruled because it considered the
objective uncertainty element and that has now been eliminated as
an element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah
Supreme Court said after Wilkinson
in Ault that a landowner must
recognize and treat an observable line as the boundary,
''regardless of whether the- landowner knows where the actual
boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." To this
court that means that knowledge of the actual or true boundary is
not relevant. Here, there was never any legal uncertainty as to
the true boundary line but there was actual uncertainty. The
court concludes that such facts as these do not allow the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to grant an interest in
property. The knowledge of the parties as to the true boundary
lines is not relevant under Ault since the elimination of the
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objective uncertainty element.
The appearances of this area, the terrain, and the nature of
the land and its uses by the parties do not allow a resident to
obtain land by merely constructing a fence and then merely
because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence
removed claim title to the area up to the fence. The court has
no question that plaintiffs predecessors did not intend to
"appropriate" the land in this way, nor is there any evidence the
fence was erected for any improper purpose. The clear inference
is that the fence was erected to contain livestock and protect a
ditch, and not to establish a boundary line. The plaintiffs'
predecessors' record deeds also showed the actual boundary lines
of the properties. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant or his
predecessors mutually acquiesced for 20 years in this fence as a
property line.
8. The statute of frauds does not apply in this case. The
statute of frauds, UCA 25-5-1, allows creation of an interest in
land by "operation of law." The doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is the operation of law. If plaintiff had prevailed
in showing all elements of that doctrine an interest in land
could be acquired by operation of law without a writing.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. The court
orders that quiet title be awarded to defendant as in the
recorded instruments.
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.
DATED this

/*

da

y of /^r7/^(/f

2004.

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM III
Brown's April 14,2004 Objection to Proposed Order
Quieting Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and
Request for Hearing (R. 493-495)

Ho,.
•FIJIL-E-D
APR
James C. Jenkins (#1658)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (435) 752-1551

"15 m
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^ ^ ^ E s u m n w i:County'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR., and
MARILYN R.BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10;
and Other Persons Unknown Claiming
Title or Interest in the Subject Property of
this Action,

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO
REAL PROPERTY IN LEE
JORGENSEN AND
REQUEST FOR HEARING

Civil No. 010600152
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

Defendant.

Plaintiffs, by and through James C. Jenkins, object to the proposed Order Quieting Title to
Real Property in Lee Jorgensen (the "Proposed Order") received by the undersigned on behalf of
Plaintiffs on the 12th day of April, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
Plaintiffs objections are as follows:
1.

Rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part "unless otherwise

directed by the Court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference." Plaintiffs presume that
GAN, P C
U" LAW
NTER
525
323 0525
1551

OFFICE
MAIN
1 15
AH 84337
3885

Defendant's Proposed Order is intended to be a judgment as defined under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. Plaintiffs object
to the reference in the Proposed Order to findings of fact and conclusions of law having been made
and entered by reference to the Court's Memorandum Decision dated April 7,2004. Rule 52 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in all actions tried upon facts without a jury, the court
shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. While Rule 52

provides that it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear in an opinion
or memorandum decision filed by the court, Plaintiffs request that a fomial set of findings and
conclusions be prepared to satisfy the additional objections set forth below.
2.

Plaintiffs object to the Proposed Order incorporating the metes and bounds

descriptions because the Memorandum Decision and the Court's findings did not state nor reference
these legal descriptions. Absent formal findings of fact which incoiporate these legal descriptions,
the Proposed Order (judgment) violates Rule 54 by referencing matters inconsistent with the specific
findings and conclusions of the Court.
3.

Plaintiffs object to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Proposed Order on the grounds that the

Court made no findings with reference to the removal offences, nor did the Memorandum Decision
suggest that such relief was to be granted.
4.

Plaintiffs object to paragraph 4 of the Proposed Order on the grounds that such

paragraph violates Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that costs may not be awarded
absent the procedure of Defendant first filing a memorandum of costs and allowing the Plaintiffs
prior notice and an opportunity to challenge such memorandum of costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs hereby obj ect to the entry of Defendant's Proposed Order Quieting
Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and additionally hereby request a hearing on these objections.

DATED this A^day of April, 2004.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

O G G A N , P.C.
:YS AT LAW

T CENTER
»OX 5 2 5
H 84323-0525
'52-1 551

ON OFFICE
\ST MAIN
30X 115
. UTAH 84337
157-3885

James C. Jenkins
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 14 day of April, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
IN LEE JORGENSEN AND REQUEST FOR HEARING, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, to
the following:
Ray G. Martineau
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
David S. Cook
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, UT 84010

J:\JCJ\PLEADINGS\Brown v. Jorgensen\brown.objection.wpd

EXHIBIT

£.

Ray G. Martineau #2105
Anthony R. Martineau #5859
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 486-0200
Fax: (801)486-0383
DavidS. Cook #0715
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 292-7216
Fax:(801)292-7217
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS E. BROWN, Jr. and MARILYN R.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO REAL
PROPERTY IN LEE JORGENSEN

vs.
LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the
subject property of this action,

Civil No. 010600152
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

Defendants.
The above entitled matter was tried before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on
March 31 and April 1, 2004.
The Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown appeared in person and were
represented by attorneys James C. Jenkins and Robert B. Funk.

Defendant Lee Jorgensen appeared in person and was represented by his attorneys Ray G.
Martineau and David S. Cook.
The Court having heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel and having
taken the matter under advisement and having made and entered the Court's Memorandum Decision
dated April 7, 2004, in which the Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth
therein and good cause appearing,
The Court now makes and enters the following judgment pursuant to said Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
1. Fee simple title to all of the following described real property should be and the same is
hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen against and jfree and clear of all boundary by acquiescence
and all other claims of Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all
other persons who may claim by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or
either of them:
PARCEL A:
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3896.809 feet and due East 19,394.098 feet from the
Northwest comer of Section 18, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Summit County, Utah (said Northwest corner bearing North 1°06'56" West from the Southwest
corner and being the basis of bearing for this description) thence North 35°30' West 1641.209
feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line of State Highway 196; thence North 43°42' East
along said right of way line 1101.410 feet to a point of tangency with a 1095.916 foot radius
curve; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through a central angle of
40°55 , 31", a distance of 837.778 feet to a point on the West line of the Southeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base Meridian;
thence leaving said right of way line South 2°28'33" East along said West line to the Southeast
comer of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15; thence East along the
South line of the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15 to the Northeast
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 15; thence South 2°30'40" East along the East

line of said Southeast quarter 1297.974 feet; thence South 86° West 1922.645 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described parcels:
Exception Parcel 1:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South,
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly
703 feet, more or less, to a point on the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning;
thence North 671 feet to the place of BEGINNING.
Exception Parcel 2:
A tract situated in the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1
South Range 5 East, Slat Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said
Section 15; and running thence South 11.00 chains; thence North 47°20' West 16.5 chains;
thence East 12.42 chains to the place of BEGINNING.
PARCEL B:
BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East quarter Section corner of Section 15, Township 1
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5
chains; thence South 58°10' East 18.02 chains, more or less, to the place of BEGINNING.
Said real property, title to which is hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen, includes the
following described 6.94-acre parcel of Lee Jorgensen's property which was claimed by Plaintiffs
Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown in this proceeding under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence:
Beginning at a point which is West 211.00 feet from the East lA corner of Section 15,
Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South
17°27'22" East 19.40 feet to a fence; thence South 64°52'21" West 25.75 feet along said
fence to a gate; thence South 59°33'56'1 West 15.81 feet to a fence corner; thence South
6°04'49" East 67.61 feet along a fence; thence South 3°31 '35" East 28.89 feet along said
fence; thence North 38°57'12" West 58.36 feet along said fence; thence North 70°47'24"
West 53.17 feet along said fence; thence North 67°20'36" West 573.54 feet along said
fence; thence North 67°15'37" West 356.37 feet along said fence; Ihence North
67°04'47" West 279.80 feet alone said fence- thence North 41°00'52" West 581 67 feet

to the Southerly right-of-way line of Brown's Canyon Road; thence along the arc of a
curve to the right 167.18 feet (radius 1103.16 feet, long chord bearing North 60°25'19"
East 167.02 feet) along said right-of-way to the Tom Brown deed line; thence South
47°20'00" East 748.14 feet along said deed line, thence North 33.00 feet along said deed
line; thence South 58°10'00" East 1189.32 feet along said deed line; thence East 99.20
feet along said deed line to the point of beginning. Containing 6.94 acres.
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. having erected a wood fence obstructing access from
the Brown's Canyon Road into the North portion of the above described Lee Jorgensen property
without Lee Jorgensen's consent and having been requested to remove the same by Defendant
Lee Jorgensen, Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove all
portions of said wood fence which traverses property of Lee Jorgensen.
3. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. having erected a wire and steel post fence along the hillside in
the Lee Jorgensen property without Lee Jorgensen's consent and having been requested to
remove the same by Lee Jorgensen, Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to
forthwith remove said fence.
4. Defendant Lee Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court
incurred herein as may hereafter be established by the filing of a memorandum of costs and
disbursements pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
MADE AND ENTERED this

day of

, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

Rmce C. Lubeck

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Quieting Title To Real
Property In Lee Jorgensen was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage
prepaid, to said individuals at the following address this 7

day of April, 2004.

James C. Jenkins
Robert B. Funk
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
88 West Center Street
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
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ADDENDUM IV
July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order (R. 565-567)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. et.al.,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 010600152
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
LEE JORGENSEN, et.al.
Defendants.
Date: July 15, 2004
The above matter came before the court July 12, 2004, for
argument on a proposed order and on plaintiffs motion to amend
the pleadings. The court tried this matter March 31, 2004, and
April 1, 2004. The court issued a ruling and order and asked
defendant to prepare an order. Defendant did so and plaintiff
objected to that proposed order, defendant responded, and the
court set the matter for argument. On June 15, 2004, plaintiff
filed a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.
Defendant opposed that motion on July 7, 2004, and plaintiff
replied on July 9, 2004. The court briefly heard argument on the
motion and took the matter under advisement.
The court is of the belief that the order prepared by
defendant should be signed with slight modification.
The court's ruling was based entirely on plaintiff's claim
to title of the disputed land based solely on a claim of boundary
by acquiescence and defendant's counterclaim to quiet title. The
trial was over who owns title to the land in dispute.
Plaintiff now claims the court can and should allow the
pleadings to be amended because other issues were tried by
express or implied consent. Plaintiff now claims that the court
can and should determine that the evidence established that
plaintiff has a prescriptive easement in the disputed land.
Plaintiff claims the evidence showed plaintiff and his family
have used and maintained the disputed property and they thus have
a prescriptive easement for that continued use.
The court's ruling was NOT based on the doctrine of
prescriptive easement. The evidence to be presented at a any
trial concerning any boundary dispute on any theory, be it
dealing with an easement, adverse possession, or boundary by

acquiescence, would be similar. Evidence would be presented
concerning actual title, surveys, deeds, use of the land and the
manner of that use, and so on. The court does not view this trial
as one where the parties agreed, explicitly or implicitly, on a
trial concerning prescriptive easement or any other cause of
action other than title under boundary by acquiescence. That
phrase "prescriptive easement" was not uttered during the trial
to the court's recollection, and it certainly was not briefed nor
argued, and the court did not make its decision based on the
doctrine. Whether the evidence "supported" such a claim is not
the question for the court at this point. It may well have
support the claim had the claim been made. It may not. That is
the problem and issue. Had defendant been given a chance to
address and challenge the theory of plaintiff now advanced, the
court has no idea what the facts would have shown and what legal
conclusions may be drawn from the facts presented. Prescriptive
easement mostly focuses on "use" of land. There was indeed
testimony on use by plaintiff, but defendant did not focus on
that because the focus was on who had title to the land.
Defendant has the right to know what claims he is defending
against. Defendant was defending against a claim of plaintiff
that plaintiff had title to this property under a property law
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The court did not
understand, and defendant did not understand, that the evidence
was aimed at establishing an easement of any kind in favor of
plaintiff. The evidence was presented by plaintiff and by
defendant to convince the court that either plaintiff or
defendant had title to the disputed land. The court decided who
had title. The court did not attempt to nor did it decide
anything else.
Plaintiff filed this case in May, 2001, asserting title to
land under one doctrine, boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiff
could have alleged alternate theories of title and easement, or
plaintiff could have amended the pleadings long ago. The court
believes the matter could have been tried on alternate theories,
but if so, defendant could have faced and challenged each or
either. Defendant did not defend against a claim of easement and
usage by plaintiff and the court did not decide such. Defendant
did not amount a defense to the "use" and "continuous" aspects of
prescriptive easement law because he did not know plaintiff was
claiming that. Whether there are defenses to such facts as
plaintiff could present is, of course, unknown. That is why the
court cannot decide if plaintiff has a viable case for a
prescriptive easement based on the facts the parties presented.
The court believes it would be fundamentally unfair to allow
plaintiff to now seek recovery of a different sort, on a
different cause of action seeking certain permissive use rather

2

than title, from what was asked for in the pleadings.
Accordingly, the court will DENY the motion to amend the
pleadings.
The court will also direct that defendant prepare a slightly
modified order based on the trial.
The ruling and order of the court may not have set forth the
boundaries of the land but the evidence established without any
real dispute where the deeds and surveys drew the property line.
The court orders that the ruling and order be amended to include
the property description as set forth in the proposed final order
quieting title as the court finds that description is an accurate
description of the properties involved.
The court also did not indicate in its ruling formally that
the fences put in pi ace by plaintiff must be taken down. It
seemed to the court that went without saying. The court has
determined that the property line is according to the surveys and
deeds in evidence, It makes no sense to allow plaintiff to
retain fences plaint iff built on property belonging to defendant,
The order requiring removal of the fence along the roadway, which
fence was installed by plaintiff is to be removed by plaintiff,
The improvement, by plaintiff, to the fence line in existence for
many years is also t o be removed by plaintiff.
Defendant is to prepare a new order with the above
modifications and the court will sign such order.
The court has attempted to follow the law in this matter.
The result is not one that appears "fair" in all respects, but it
is one wherein the court has followed the law as best it can and
the result follows. If the court believed that the law did not
answer the questions presented and it could turn to equity, the
result may be different. However, the court believes the legal
principles set forth in its ruling and order are correct and this
result follows.
DATED this

day of

2004

^UCEM:. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^ f e ^ T ^
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ADDENDUM V
August 2, 2004 Judgment Quieting Title to Real
Property in Lee Jorgensen and Directing Removal of
Fence/Fence Improvements (R. 569-573)
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Ray G. Martineau #2105
Anthony R. Martineau #5859
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801)486-0200
Fax: (801)486-0383
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DavidS. Cook #0715
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 292-7216
Fax:(801)292-7217
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS E. BROWN, Jr. and MARILYN R.
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE TO REAL
PROPERTY IN LEE JORGENSEN AND
DIRECTING REMOVAL OF FENCE/FENCE
IMPROVEMENTS

LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the
subject property of this action,
Defendants.

Civil No. 010600152
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

The above entitled matter was tried before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on
March 31 and April 1, 2004.
The Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown appeared in person and were
represented by attorneys James C. Jenkins and Robert B. Funic.

Defendant Lee Jorgensen appeared in person and was represented by his attorneys Ray G.
Martineau and David S. Cook.
The Court heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, took the matter
under advisement and made and entered the Court's Memorandum Decision dated April 7, 2004, in
which the Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth therein and ordered that
quiet title be awarded to Defendant as in the recorded instruments and directed Defendant to prepare an
order in compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth the Court's ruling.
By Objection to Proposed Order Quieting Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and Request
for Hearing dated April 14, 2004, Plaintiffs objected to the form of order quieting title in Lee Jorgensen
prepared by Defendant.
On or about June 10, 2004 Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to
Conform to the Evidence; Motion to Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter or Amend the
Court's Memorandum Decision and Request for Hearing and a memorandum in support of the said
motions.
Defendant filed memorandums responding to Plaintiffs' April 10, 2004 objection and June 10,
2004 motions and those matters were heard by the Court on July 12, 2004.
By Ruling and Order dated July 15, 2004, the Court denied Plaintiffs June 10, 2004 motions for
the reasons set forth in that Ruling and Order; ruled the Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision
amended to include the property description as set forth in Defendant's proposed order, finding such to
be an accurate description of the properties involved, ruled that Plaintiff is to remove the fence installed
by Plaintiff along the roadway and the improvements made by Plaintiff to the fenceline which has been
in existence for many years and directed Defendant to prepare a new order with those modifications.

NOW THEREFORE, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment pursuant to the
Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision and the Court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order:
1. Fee simple title to all of the following described real property should be and the same is
hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen against and free and clear of all boundary by acquiescence
and all other claims of Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all
other persons who may claim by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or
either of them:
PARCEL A:
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3896.809 feet and due East 19,394.098 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 18, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Summit County, Utah (said Northwest comer bearing North 1°06'56" West from the Southwest
comer and being the basis of bearing for this description) thence North 35°30' West 1641.209
feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line of State Highway 196; thence North 43°42' East
along said right of way line 1101.410 feet to a point of tangency with a 1095.916 foot radius
curve; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through a central angle of
40°55'3r', a distance of 837.778 feet to a point on the West line of the Southeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base Meridian;
thence leaving said right of way line South 2°28'33" East along said West line to the Southeast
corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15; thence East along the
South line of the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15 to the Northeast
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 15; thence South 2°30'40" East along the East
line of said Southeast quarter 1297.974 feet; thence South 86° West 1922.64S feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described parcels:
Exception Parcel 1 :
BEGINNING at the Northeast comer of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South,
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly
703 feet, more or less, to a point on the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning;
thence North 671 feet to the place of BEGINNING.
Exception Parcel 2:
A tract situated in the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows:

BEGINNING at the Northeast comer of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said
Section 15; and running thence South 11.00 chains; thence North 47°20' West 16.5 chains;
thence East 12.42 chains to the place of BEGINNING.
PARCEL B:
BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East quarter Section comer of Section 15, Township 1
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5
chains; thence South 58°10' East 18.02 chains, more or less, to the place of BEGINNING.
Said real property, title to which is hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen, includes the
following described 6.94-acre parcel of Lee Jorgensen's property wliich was claimed by Plaintiffs
Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown in this proceeding under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence:
Beginning at a point which is West 211.00 feet from the East lA comer of Section 15,
Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South
\T2T2T
East 19.40 feet to a fence; thence South 64°52'21" West 25.75 feet along said
fence to a gate; thence South 59°33'56" West 15.81 feet to a fence comer; thence South
6°04'49" East 67.61 feet along a fence; thence South 3°31'35" East 28.89 feet along said
fence; thence North 38°57'12" West 58.36 feet along said fence; thence North 70°47'24"
West 53.17 feet along said fence; thence North 67°20'36" West 573.54 feet along said
fence; thence North 67°15'37" West 356.37 feet along said fence; thence North
67°04'47" West 279.80 feet along said fence; thence North 41°00'52" West 581.67 feet
to the Southerly right-of-way line of Brown's Canyon Road; thence along the arc of a
curve to the right 167.18 feet (radius 1103.16 feet, long chord bearing North 60°25 , 19"
East 167.02 feet) along said right-of-way to the Tom Brown dttd line; thence South
47°20'00" East 748.14 feet along said deed line, thence North 33.00 feet along said deed
line; thence South 58°10'00" East 1189.32 feet along said deed line; thence East 99.20
feet along said deed line to the point of beginning. Containing 6.94 acres.
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the
wood fence erected by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along Brown's Canyon Road in a portion of the
above described Lee Jorgensen property.

3. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the wire and
fence post improvements installed by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along part of the fence along the
hillside in a portion of the Lee Jorgensen property.
4. Defendant Lee Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court
incurred herein as may hereafter be established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements
filed pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
MADE AND ENTERED this ^ day of

I—y^

r—

_, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

Bruce C. Lubeck
District Court Judge
#'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Quieting Title To Real
Property hi Lee Jorgensen And Directing Removal Of Fence/Fence Improvements was served upon the
following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following
address this ^ 7 day of July, 2004.
James C. Jenkins
Robert B. Funk
OLSON &HOGGAN,P.C.
88 West Center Street
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
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